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INTRODUCTION
Former employees often possess information that can be help-
ful and even vital to the resolution of anticipated or pending litiga-
tion involving the employer. Seemingly routine ex parte contact
with ex-employees by counsel on either side of the dispute may,
however, propel the attorney into a twilight zone of legal and ethical
uncertainty. An attorney's plight in negotiating this unsettled terri-
tory stems from the ill-defined, conflicting law governing two im-
portant aspects of informal discovery of a corporate party's former
employees:' the initial propriety of such ex parte contacts, and the
subsequent discoverability by opposing counsel of the content of in-
formation exchanged during these contacts. This Article identifies
and critiques existing sources of confusion in the law and proposes
revised and alternative discovery procedures to provide equal access
to information possessed by ex-employees, while simultaneously
1. In the context of this Article, "informal discovery" means the collection of infor-
mation, either by attorneys or their subordinates, during telephone or personal inter-
views of former employees, that occur without participation by, or consent of, opposing
counsel. "Formal discovery" refers to the fact-gathering methods available pursuant to
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as depositions. The terms "corpo-
rate party" and "corporate counsel" are used throughout this Article, although in fact
the employer could be another party, such as a sole proprietorship, unincorporated as-
sociation, or the like.
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safeguarding the integrity of that information. Its primary emphasis
is on federal jurisprudence, although important points of consensus
and departure between state and federal law are noted, as
appropriate.2
Part I explains the issues that arise in informal discovery, and
the difficulties with clearly resolving those issues given the conflict-
ing state of the law. Part II discusses application of the attorney-
client privilege to communications between corporate counsel and
former employees, concluding that the privilege should not shield
the content of such communications from discovery by opposing
counsel. Because the attorney-client privilege issue and the debate
over ex parte contact both turn on whether a former employee is a
"party" to the litigation, an exposition of the ethical concerns of ex
parte contact follows in Part III, which concludes that ex parte con-
tact by opposing counsel should be allowed. Part IV examines the
applicability of the work product doctrine in shielding from discov-
ery certain tangible materials related to the interview. This Article
advocates absolute immunity from discovery for attorney notes and
memoranda, and for collections of documents selected by counsel
for discussion with former employees; limited discovery of signed
witness statements generated pursuant to the interview; and fairly
broad discovery of the content of counsel's questions and state-
ments during the interview.
The proposed discovery guidelines in the Conclusion are of-
fered with the ambitious, if not elusive, goal of reconciling the com-
peting interests and policies that rouse litigants to battle when
informal discovery is conducted of former employees, while simulta-
neously giving due regard to the pragmatic impact that new or re-
2. States enjoy autonomy to enact or adopt their own standards defining the attor-
ney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and ethical conduct of lawyers. Federal
courts for the most part are also empowered to develop their own body of common law
on work product and attorney-client privilege issues. See generally EDNA S. EPSTEIN &
MICHAEL M. MARTIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT Doc-
TRINE 7-10 (2d ed. 1989).
Ethical standards are often embodied in local district court rules. See, e.g., Polycast
Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Despite the
appearance of independence of the state and federal systems, there is substantial over-
lap and, in many instances, consistency. For example, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires federal courts to apply state law on attorney-client privilege when a
state law claim is being adjudicated. EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra, at 8-9; see also Command
Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line (USA) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 95 (D. Mass. 1987) (recognizing
that state law applied to an attorney-client privilege dispute in a diversity suit, but find-
ing no Massachusetts precedent on point and applying federal common law because
Massachusetts' highest court had previously "demonstrated its willingness to follow fed-
eral precedent concerning the nature of the attorney-client privilege").
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vised rules may have on the litigants and the adversarial process.
The overriding objective is to provide equal access by all parties to
the information possessed by former employees, while at the same
time providing mechanisms to deter, and if necessary to reveal, in-
appropriate manipulation of these potential witnesses by counsel.
I. ISSUES PRESENTED BY INFORMAL DISCOVERY
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,4 the Supreme Court held that the
attorney-client privilege shields from discovery the content of com-
munications between corporate counsel and both lower- and higher-
echelon employees who possess knowledge relevant to anticipated
or pending litigation.5 While acknowledging the existence of nu-
merous related concerns beyond the scope of its narrow, case-spe-
cific holding, the Upjohn Court declined "to lay down a broad rule or
series of rules to govern all conceivable questions in this area. '"6 In
particular, the Court expressly declined to determine whether the
attorney-client privilege extends to communications between corpo-
rate counsel and former employees of the corporate party.7
More than a decade has passed since the Upjohn Court deferred
resolution of this issue, and no clear consensus has emerged as to
whether corporate counsel's discourse with former employees is im-
3. In addition to the external controls advocated in this Article, there are self-im-
posed limits on attorney conduct during ex parte interviews. One hopes this self-re-
straint stems from a respect for the legal system. Perhaps more realistically, temperance
is born of the fear that overt coaching will undermine the witness's credibility. Professor
McElhaney describes an attorney's worst nightmare in this regard: "The witness who is
told what to say is the one who is likely to blurt out, 'That's what the lawyer told me to
say' when he is attacked on cross-examination." James W. McElhaney, Horse-Shedding the
Witness, TRIAL, Oct. 1987, at 80, 84. Many legalists believe that the prosecutor's exces-
sive coaching of a key witness so undermined the witness's credibility that it resulted in
the acquittal of the owners of the infamous Triangle Waist Company on manslaughter
charges. The charges were based on the deaths of 146 garment factory workers whose
exit from the fiery inferno consuming their workplace was blocked by doors locked in
violation of safety regulations. See Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure. A
Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1984).
4. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
5. See id. at 396. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision under review
held that the privilege only covered exchanges between upper-level managers and cor-
porate attorneys. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
6. 449 U.S. at 386.
7. See id. at 394 n.3. The Court purportedly declined to address this point because
neither of the courts below had addressed it, even though interviews with former em-
ployees were at issue in the case. See id.
242 [VOL. 51:239
HeinOnline  -- 51 Md. L. Rev. 242 1992
INFORMAL DISCOVERY & FORMER EMPLOYEES
munized from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.8 An attor-
ney's attempt to discover information held by a party's (or potential
party's) former employees also implicates the work product doc-
trine,' as well as ethical rules prohibiting ex parte contact with per-
sons represented by legal counsel."° Therefore, courts and litigants
repeatedly grapple with a trilogy of issues when informal discovery
is sought of former employees:
1. Whether the attorney-client privilege erects an impenetra-
ble barrier around communications between corporate counsel and
the corporation's former employees, repelling all attempts by op-
posing counsel to discover the contents of those communications;
2. Whether contact by opposing counsel with a corporate
party's former employees transgresses the ethical prohibition
against ex parte contact with a party represented by counsel; and
3. Whether the work product doctrine immunizes from dis-
covery by opposing counsel the communications between counsel
for either party and former employees, as well as materials memori-
alizing those communications.
Case law is clear that if nonparties to the litigation are willing,'"
8. The long-standing nature of the confusion surrounding discovery of information
held by current employees of a corporate client is evidenced by the several decades of
scholarship focusing on these issues; however, the discovery of former employees, espe-
cially in the context of informal ex parte interviews, has not been thoroughly addressed.
See, e.g., David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953 (1956); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients]; R. Scott
McGrew, Note, Upjohn Co. v. United States: Death Knell for the Control Group Test and a
Plea for a Policy-Oriented Standard to Corporate Discovery, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1043 (1980).
9. The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are related but distinct
concepts that shield certain communications and tangible materials from discovery by
opposing counsel. The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, is absolute in its
protection, and covers oral as well as written communications. See infra Part II. The
work product doctrine can be asserted by the attorney, provides qualified rather than
absolute immunity from discovery, and primarily applies to tangible materials. See infra
Part IV; see also John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 292 (1989)
(explaining differences between attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, but
acknowledging the argument that the two concepts have been largely synthesized by
Supreme Court decisions).
10. This prohibition is set forth in various codes of attorney ethics including those
promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA). See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; see also infra
Part III.
11. See, e.g., Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp., l J0 F.R.D. 414, 419 (D. Mass. 1986)
(The decision to consent to an interview with counsel "is entirely up to the particular
employee."); Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., 356 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[A]ny witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires."). In
1992] 243
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counsel for all parties have the right to interview them "in private,
without the presence or consent of opposing counsel, and without a
transcript being made."' 2 In fact, efforts to restrict an attorney's
use of informal interviews of nonparties traditionally have been dis-
favored by the courts.' 3 However, no procedural, ethical, or eviden-
tiary rule explicitly condones, condemns, or establishes guidelines
for such informal discovery of nonparties, 4 making resolution of
the issues above extremely difficult.
Further, this unsettled state of the law is unacceptable, in light
of the potent utility of the ex parte interview as a discovery device,' 5
the potential for abuse of this tool,'" and the time and expense con-
sumed in pretrial battles over informal discovery. 17
A. The Potent Utility of Informal Discovery
The usefulness and cost effectiveness of informal interviews
with former employees is beyond dispute. From corporate coun-
sel's perspective, the ex parte meeting provides the opportunity to
explain the status of the pending or anticipated litigation, to deter-
mine whether opposing counsel has already contacted the inter-
viewee, 18 to ascertain the former employee's current attitude toward
fact, it has been suggested that motivating a nonparty witness to talk to an attorney is
not always an easy task. See R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE 71 (1991).
12. IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that trial judge ex-
ceeded his authority by requiring witness interviews to be held with either opposing
counsel or a stenographer present, because such conditions "unduly infringed upon
counsels' ability to prepare their case for trial, and have ... lessened the effectiveness of
that trial by placing before the Court, not the case as finally prepared and refined by
counsel, but rather a hodgepodge of information accumulated in the early stages of
counsel's preparation"); see also Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188-89 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (holding that prosecutor's instruction to witnesses not to talk to anyone un-
less prosecutor was present impermissibly interfered with defendant's ability to prepare
defense), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969); D'Amico v. Cox Creek Refining Co., 126
F.R.D. 501, 507 (D. Md. 1989) (citing Edelstein as persuasive).
13. See Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 417; Edelstein, 526 F.2d at 41-42.
14. The trial court's regulation of informal discovery is authorized by the court's
inherent power to control litigation practices. Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132
F.R.D. 560, 564 (C.D. Utah 1990) (conduct of ex parte interviews controlled by court
rather than by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp.
250, 253 (D, Kan. 1988).
15. See infra Subpart I.A.
16. See infra Subpart I.B.
17. See infra Subpart I.C.
18. If opposing counsel has made contact, corporate counsel will explore the nature
and content of the communication. If no contact has occurred, counsel in all probability
will explain that the individual is not obligated to talk to anyone about the litigation
unless he so desires.
244 [VOL. 51:239
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the corporation, and to probe the extent of the former employee's
knowledge of facts relevant to the lawsuit. It also gives counsel lati-
tude to determine the former employee's familiarity with documents
that have or may become points of contention in the litigation, to
persuade the former employee to execute a written statement or af-
fidavit that embodies his current recollection about the matter in
controversy,' 9 and to test counsel's own theories and opinions
about the case.2 0 Allowing corporate counsel freely to pursue these
objectives permits a more realistic assessment by counsel of whether
an early settlement would best serve his client's interests.2 ' De-
pending on the tone and quality of information conveyed during the
interview, corporate counsel might also offer to represent the for-
mer employee if the need for legal counsel arises. 22 Should the for-
mer employee prove uncooperative, or even hostile, counsel will
attempt to unearth the origin of the animosity and diffuse the indi-
vidual's anger, or risk that the cause of the individual's rancor be-
comes apparent at trial and damages his client.23
Opposing counsel's goals for engaging former employees in ex
parte communications are often the same as those sought by corpo-
rate counsel. In addition, opposing counsel's initial contact with
former employees may play a critical role in her determination of
whether a complaint should be filed in the first place, and in identifi-
cation of the individuals or entities to be named as parties. In some
instances, informal interviews provide a cost-effective mechanism
that allows plaintiffs fully to investigate and litigate a case that they
19. The future utility of such sworn statements includes providing support for fac-
tual assertions made in discovery or dispositive motions, refreshing the employee's
memory prior to testifying in a deposition or at trial, and impeaching the employee
should his recollection of events change. Such statements can be problematic because
"decisions whether to ask witnesses to sign statements often must be made on the spot
and without the opportunity to reflect on the precise language in the witness statement."
DESSEM, supra note 11, at 72.
20. Sharing legal theories in this context has at least two consequences: obtaining
the former employee's evaluation of the viability of the theories when tested against the
"hard facts" of the case, and subtly persuading the former employee that the positions
taken by the corporation are correct.
21. Informal investigations are valuable not only for the favorable information they
yield, but also because they reveal unfavorable information useful in preparing chal-
lenges to the adversary's theories. See DESSEM, supra note 11, at 69; Stephen McG.
Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of
Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 315, 327 (1991). Interviews that pro-
duce a bountiful harvest of adverse facts no doubt would inspire settlement.
22. The former employee may perceive a need for legal counsel if his deposition is
formally noticed or even if opposing counsel schedules an informal interview.
23. For example, the former employee might have been involuntarily terminated or
denied a promotion.
1992] 245
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might not pursue if only formal discovery were allowed. 24
B. The Potential for Abuse
The number and validity of counsel's reasons for conducting
informal interviews of a corporate party's former employees may
make the process appear routine and innocuous. In fact, an attor-
ney's failure to conduct preliminary interviews with ex-employees
might be construed as neglect of her duty to prosecute her client's
claim zealously or to fashion a vigorous defense. Yet, the potential
for abuse of this vital discovery tool demands court intervention and
monitoring. Of foremost concern is the possibility that counsel will,
either through subtle suggestions or unabashed indoctrination, ma-
nipulate the former employee's recollection of key events.25 Ex
parte contact with a witness or potential witness has been aptly char-
acterized as representing "the worst qualities of the legal system"
because "'the temptation to invent or embellish a story can be very
strong."' 26 Such contacts "substantially increase the risk of testimo-
nial distortion through the substitution of the attorney's suggestions
for the witness's perceptions. ' 27 Also, ex parte contact "may boost
a witness's confidence" in the accuracy of his recollection without in
truth improving it, an impact that is "most disturbing because both
courts and psychologists have observed that fact-finders are keenly
aware of witness confidence and depend on it in making judgments
about testimonial reliability."' 28 Finally, the initial contact may so
intimidate the ex-employee that she will refuse to participate in the
factfinding process absent a court order, and even if so ordered, will
not be entirely forthcoming regarding the information she
24. See, e.g., Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that requiring plaintiffs to depose all former employees rather than using ex
parte interviews as a screening device will prevent plaintiffs from pursuing their case).
Corporate defendants may be in a better position than plaintiffs to absorb the costs of a
system requiring formal discovery of ex-employees, but there is no justification for man-
dating such economic waste. As the Bobele court observed, "[n]ot every witness' testi-
mony is worth the price of a deposition; in fact, many of the former employees which
plaintiffs want to interview may not be able to provide any relevant information at all."
Id.
25. See generally Applegate, supra note 9 (discussing doctrinal and ethical problems of
witness preparation); Landsman, supra note 3 (proposing limits on attorney contact with
disinterested witnesses in civil cases).
26. Applegate, supra note 9, at 279. Professor Applegate observes that "coaching"
by counsel can be inadvertent as well as intentional, due to the "enormous pressure on a
partisan advocate to produce a story favorable to the client." Id. at 328.
27. Landsman, supra note 3, at 555. Such substitution extinguishes any hope of re-
trieving the individual's original perceptions. See id.
28. Id. at 556.
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possesses.29
Clearly, application of any privilege or doctrine to shroud the
content of these interviews in secrecy not only tempts an attorney to
engage a former employee in revisionist history, but also prevents
opposing counsel from exposing this powerful source of bias. The
taint caused by counsel's coaching of an ex-employee is intensified
by the inclination of the factfinder to view any nonparty as an in-
dependent witness, and thus accord considerable credibility to her
testimony.3 0
The courts' task of refereeing litigants' disputes over access to a
corporate party's former employees, as well as the subsequent dis-
coverability of the content of ex parte communications resulting
from that access, is further complicated by the somewhat incongru-
ous representations that counsel for each litigant offers to the court
regarding the former employees. Depending on the particular point
in the litigation, corporate counsel will inconsistently attempt to
portray the former employees as: (1) alter egos or compatriots of
his corporate client whose communications with corporate counsel
come within the attorney-client privilege, (2) unaffiliated witnesses
whose independence renders any testimony favorable to the corpo-
ration particularly credible, or (3) malcontents whose negative testi-
mony is inspired by ill-will toward the corporation rather than based
upon an honest recollection of the facts. Opposing counsel also
walks a fine line: she must convince the court that her adversary's
former employees fully support her view of relevant events, while at
the same time she must eschew any impression that her communica-
tions with the former employees have strayed over the boundaries
of appropriate ethical conduct set forth in the rules governing ex
parte contact, conflicts of interest, and client solicitation.3 '
29. An ex-employee may insulate herself from ex parte contact by refusing to con-
sent to an interview or retaining independent legal counsel and referring all inquiries to
that attorney. This latter technique was successfully employed by two reluctant wit-
nesses in United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 209 (4th Cir. 1976). In Jones, both the
trial court and the appellate court rejected the defendants' claim of prejudice based on
the unavailability of pretrial interviews with these two witnesses. See id. at 209-10.
30. "Both courts and psychologists have observed that the testimony of disinterested
witnesses is one of the most persuasive sources of evidence in a lawsuit. Such testimony
... is decisive in a large percentage of the cases in which it is offered." Landsman, supra
note 3, at 549. Because termination of the employment relationship intuitively demands
a presumption that the former employee is no longer aligned with the corporate party,
application of the attorney-client privilege or ethical rules to limit access to former em-
ployees only to corporate counsel is inherently inequitable.
31. Ex parte contact with a represented party is prohibited by Model Rule 4.2 and
DR 7-104(A)(1). See supra note 10. Representing parties with conflicting interests is
proscribed by Model Rule 1.7 and DR 5-105, and solicitation of clients is barred by
1992]
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C. Time and Expense of Pretrial Battles
The first Federal Rule of Civil Procedure articulates the expec-
tation that every action be resolved in a "just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive" manner.32 Modem pretrial practices have fallen far short of
that laudable goal. As one judge has observed, "[d]iscovery, origi-
nally conceived as the servant of the litigants to assist them in reach-
ing a just outcome, now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict
disproportionate costs and burdens. Often it is conducted so ag-
gressively and abusively that it frustrates the objectives of the Fed-
eral Rules. ' 3  Indeed, the President has taken note of this
untenable situation and has issued an Executive Order34 aimed at
curbing "the harmful consequences of these litigation practices. 35
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States has also circulated, for discussion
purposes, a number of proposed amendments to streamline discov-
ery.3 6 Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict .1hen, if at all, these
Model Rule 7.3 and DR 2-104(A). For a comprehensive discussion of these rules and
variations of them adopted in various jurisdictions, see generally STEPHEN GILLERS &
Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (1991).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
33. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703, 703 (1989). Judge Schwarzer advocates a procedural rule
whereby all parties would be required automatically to exchange basic information, in-
cluding the identity of parties with knowledge and production of relevant documents,
See id. at 721-22.
34. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
35. Id. The preamble to Executive Order Number 12,778 states as its inspiration
"the tremendous growth of litigation [that] has burdened the American court system
and has imposed high costs on American individuals, small businesses, industry, profes-
sionals, and government at all levels" paired with "several current litigation practices
[that] add to these burdens and cost by prolonging the resolution of disputes." Id. Sec-
tion 1 (d) (1) of the Order requires all litigation counsel who represent the federal gov-
ernment to follow a number of procedures, including the automatic disclosure of "core
information" to the adversary, with that term defined as the names and addresses of
persons with relevant information and the location of relevant documents. The Order
also mandates a thorough evaluation of any document request issued by government
attorneys "to determine that the request is not cumulative or duplicative, unreasonable,
oppressive, unduly burdensome or expensive" in view of all the circumstances of the
dispute. See id. § l(d)(2).
36. The Committee's August 1991 proposed amendments to the federal rules incor-
porate substantial revisions to the discovery process as advocated by Judge Schwarzer
and others. See COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1991).
Rule 16 would be expanded to allow more detailed planning of discovery during the
initial pretrial conference. Id. at 9. Rule 26(a) would require automatic disclosure of
certain information routinely requested by opposing counsel, including the identity of
all persons with knowledge of relevant facts, production or description of all "docu-
248 [VOL. 51:239
HeinOnline  -- 51 Md. L. Rev. 248 1992
INFORMAL DISCOVERY & FORMER EMPLOYEES
proposed procedural reforms will be in place.3 7 Moreover, discov-
ery orders are interlocutory in nature and therefore are not immedi-
ately appealable; thus, litigants dissatisfied with the trial court's
ruling on the discoverability of certain materials are forced to abide
by the ruling and proceed through a trial that may be tainted by
inadequate or inappropriate discovery, or seek immediate appeal
pursuant to an extraordinary writ such as mandamus. The latter al-
ternative is disfavored by the courts and is expensive and time con-
suming for the parties."8
D. An Attempt to Articulate Clearer Standards
Because of the significant stakes involved, the development of
consistent, comprehensive guidelines governing the discoverability
of information held by former employees is critical to the effective
and appropriate use of informal, ex parte interviews as a valid dis-
covery tool.39 The Supreme Court's observation in Upjohn that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege can be served only if liti-
gants are able "to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected"4 applies equally to the
ments, data compilations, and tangible things," a computation of damages claimed, and
a comprehensive report by all expert witnesses. Id. at 14. The proposed amendment to
Rule 33(a) limits each party to 15 interrogatories, id. at 49, while Rules 30(a)(2)(A) and
30(d) would limit each party to 10 depositions of 6 hours each, id. at 33. As with the
current rules, however, the amendments allow for modifications of the rules by agree-
ment of the parties, leave of the court, or both.
37. The Advisory Committee has solicited comments and held several public hear-
ings on the August 1991 draft of the proposed amendments. The Committee will recon-
sider its draft in light of these comments, and then forward its proposed revisions to the
Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. If the
Standing Committee approves, the revisions will be sent to the Judicial Conference for
possible consideration at the September 1992 meeting. The Conference will then for-
ward the draft to the United States Supreme Court, which in turn will issue a recommen-
dation to Congress regarding enactment of the amendments. See Federal Rules: Major
Changes Sought by Judicial Conference Working Group, 60 U.S.L.W. 2158 (Sept. 10, 1991).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1974) (citing strong public
policy disfavoring piecemeal, interlocutory review of discovery orders); Admiral Ins. Co.
v. United States District Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1989).
39. Most, if not all, of the potential for abuse could be eliminated by adoption of
Professor Landsman's suggestion that all pretrial contacts with disinterested witnesses
be recorded and that opposing counsel be given the opportunity to attend. See Lands-
man, supra note 3, at 558. But the utility of the informal, ex parte interview as a legiti-
mate screening device for potential witnesses is lost in a system that elevates the
informal interview to a procedure mirroring a formal deposition. Professor Landsman
concedes that ex parte interviews may be appropriate where such "contacts are truly
likely to increase the volume of reliable information or enhance the prospects of efficient
inquiry." Id. at 559.
40. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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protections and prohibitions conferred by the work product doc-
trine and by ethical rules of conduct. "An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying appli-
cations by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."'"
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN CORPORATE COUNSEL AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context
The origins of the attorney-client privilege can be traced to an-
cient Roman law, which prohibited a slave from revealing his
master's secrets.4" In its modern form, the attorney-client privilege
shields from discovery the content of a communication 43 made in
confidence4 4 between a client (or potential client4 5) and a licensed
attorney or her subordinate, where the communication was made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice,46 has not been waived,47
41. Id. While this Article narrowly focuses upon the informal interviews conducted
prior to designation of a former employee as a witness, Professor Applegate's comments
on the related area of witness preparation ring true here: "Witness preparation is
treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession. The resulting lack of rules,
guidelines and scholarship has created significant uncertainty about the permissible
types and methods of witness preparation." Applegate, supra note 9, at 279.
42. Marshall Williams, The Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in View of Reason
and Experience, 25 How. L.J. 425, 426 (1982).
43. The privilege does not shield from discovery the facts underlying the communi-
cation, but only the communication itself. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
395 (1981).
44. Generally, the client must manifest an expectation that the communication was
made in confidence for the privilege to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d
714, 723 (9th Cir.) (reflecting general rule that exposure of third party to communica-
tions between attorney and client destroys expectation of privacy, thus defeating claim
of attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); Odmark v. Westside
Bancorp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 552, 556 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (finding that failure of officers
and directors to request confidentiality of corporate attorneys negated essential element
of attorney-client privilege).
45. If the other criteria are met, the privilege extends to a preliminary consultation
between a lawyer and a potential client, even though actual employment of the attorney
does not result. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). The obvious reason for extending the privi-
lege to initial consultations is that "no person could ever safely consult an attorney for
the first time with a view to his employment if the privilege depended on the chance of
whether the attorney after hearing his statement of the facts decided to accept the em-
ployment or decline it." In re Dupont's Estate, 140 P.2d 866, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
46. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
47. The privilege belongs to the client and thus only the client may waive it. See, e.g.,
In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987). Accompanying the ownership of the
privilege is the responsibility to maintain continued confidentiality of the communica-
tions to ensure that a waiver does not occur, through either the client's express consent
or implied consent through conduct. Id. at 101.
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and is not made for the purpose of committing a tort or a crime.48
Admittedly, application of the privilege has the undesirable effect of
withholding relevant information from the factfinder.4' Neverthe-
less, full disclosure of information by the client to the attorney is
critical to the attorney's responsibility to provide fully informed
legal advice, and such disclosure will only take place where confi-
dentiality is guaranteed.5 ° The Upjohn Court summed up this ra-
tionale: "The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client." 5'
It has been proposed that where the information sought is un-
available from other sources, an exception to the privilege should be
recognized. As one court rejecting this proposal explained:
The attorney-client privilege, like all other evidentiary
privileges, may obstruct a party's access to the truth.
Although it may be inequitable that information contained
in privileged materials is available to only one side in a dis-
pute, a determination that communications or materials are
privileged is simply a choice to protect the communication
and relationship against claims of competing interests.
Any inequity in terms of access to information is the price
the system pays to maintain the integrity of the privilege.
An unavailability exception is, therefore, inconsistent with
the nature and the purpose of the privilege.5"
48. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
1983). One of the cases most frequently cited for its comprehensive definition of attor-
ney-client privilege is United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See also EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 2, for a comprehensive
discussion of the attorney-client privilege.
49. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974); American Nat'l Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330,
1333 (Alaska 1982).
50. The historic context and modem rationale for the privilege was stated by the
district court in In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963):
In the eighteenth century, when the desire for the truth overcame the wish to
protect the honor of witnesses and several testimonial privileges disappeared,
the attorney-client privilege was retained, on the new theory that it was neces-
sary to encourage clients to make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to
enable the latter properly to advise the clients. This is the basis of the privilege
today.
Id. at 15; see also cases cited supra note 49. Despite its retained prestige, courts often
strictly construe the scope of the attorney-client privilege to avoid impairment of the
factfinding process. See, e.g., American Nat'l Watermattress Corp., 642 P.2d at 1333; cases
cited infra note 54.
51. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
52. Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir.
1992]
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In view of the menace to the factfinding process posed by any
withholding of information, it has repeatedly been said that the priv-
ilege should be applied " 'only where necessary to achieve its pur-
pose,' -3 and that when applied, the privilege must be narrowly
tailored.
While neither the basic definition of the attorney-client privi-
lege nor the elementary rationale offered for its existence suggest
difficulty in its interpretation, the application of the privilege has
proven especially cumbersome when the client is a corporation.5 5
Due to the nature of a corporation as an amorphous legal fiction,
application of the attorney-client privilege to corporate entities tra-
ditionally focuses on attempts to identify the person or persons who
constitute the corporate client.56 Courts have resolved this issue in-
1989) (footnote omitted). The communication sought in this case was a transcribed
interview, conducted in anticipation of litigation, between counsel for a parent corpora-
tion and a subsidiary's employee, who resigned shortly after the interview. After litiga-
tion commenced, the former employee, in response to the plaintiffs' notice of
deposition, informed the plaintiffs' counsel that he would refuse to answer questions on
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. The plaintiffs sought discovery of the in-
terview transcript on the theory that the attorney-client privilege should not protect in-
formation that is unavailable from other sources. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
arguments because such an exception would "force counsel to warn their clients against
communicating sensitive information for fear of subsequent forced disclosure," thereby
negating the goal of promoting full and open disclosure between attorney and client.
See id.
53. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (quoting Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
54. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Gar-
ner v. Wolfenbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971); In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Odmark
v. Westside Bancorp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 552, 555 (W.D. Wash. 1986); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 46, § 2291, at 545 (explaining that because the privilege's "obstruction is plain and
concrete" and its benefits are "indirect and speculative," its coverage must be "strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle").
Despite the history and continued vitality of the attorney-client privilege, not everyone
remains convinced of its virtues. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Contin-
ued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982).
55. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege
Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279 (1984); Williams, supra note 42.
56. An early effort to exclude corporations from the attorney-client privilege protec-
tions afforded individual litigants was resoundingly unsuccessful. In Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), aft'don reh'g, 209 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. I1. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963),
the trial court held that the privilege was personal in nature and that the confidentiality
required for application of the privilege was incompatible with the exchange of informa-
tion in a corporate setting. See 207 F. Supp. at 773-75. The Seventh Circuit unani-
mously reversed, stating in its en banc decision that "[a] corporation is entitled to the
same treatment as any other 'client'-no more and no less." 320 F.2d at 324. The
Supreme Court declined further review. See 375 U.S. 929. For an argument that Radiant
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consistently, with three primary tests emerging over time.
In the narrowest of the three approaches, courts limited cover-
age of the attorney-client privilege to communications between cor-
porate counsel and a limited pool of officers and employees,
characterized as the "control group," who were empowered to make
decisions on behalf of the corporation in response to legal advice. 7
This test was criticized for ignoring the realities of corporate life,
because often the lower echelon employees possess the information
relevant to resolution of a corporate legal problem. 51 Other courts
embraced a more expansive definition of the term "client" that in-
cluded any employees, regardless of rank, who possessed knowl-
edge relevant to the litigation.59 Under this standard, the privilege
attached only where the communication was made to corporate
counsel at the instruction of the employee's supervisor and con-
cerned subject matter within the scope of the employee's duties.
These criteria, often referred to as the "subject matter" test,60 were
criticized as being too broad.61 A modified version of the subject
matter test further narrowed the privilege. It limited application of
the privilege to communications between employees and corporate
counsel that had been disseminated beyond those persons who, be-
cause of the corporate structure, needed to know of its contents.6 2
Burners continues to affect the modern laws of privilege, see R. David White, Radiant
Burners Still Radiating. Attorney-Client Privilege for the Corporation, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 293
(1982).
57. The genesis for the control group test is City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
The control group test was embraced by at least three circuit courts of appeals, as well as
several district courts outside of those circuits. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968);
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipping & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va.
1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Garrison v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
58. See Lance J. Madden, Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control
Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759, 762, 767 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970),
a/Pd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (equally divided Court); see also infra note 64.
60. For the seminal case for the subject matter or scope of employment test, see
Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491-92.
61. See, e.g., Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients, supra note 8, at 432-34.
62. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, para.
503(b)[04], at 503-66 to 503-70 (1991); see also Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, Inc., 572
F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1987). The Eighth Circuit's test, announced in Diversified Indus-
tries, applied the attorney-client privilege to a communication between corporate counsel
and an employee where the following conditions were met:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2)
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Numerous other standards have been proposed but have not been
widely accepted.6"
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not rushed to reconcile
the conflicting standards. The Court declined an opportunity to ad-
dress the controversy surrounding the attorney-client privilege in
the corporate context in 1971.6 A decade later, the Court finally
confronted the issue in Upjohn Co. v. United States65 and eliminated
some, but hardly all, of the confusion. 66 A brief discussion of pre-
Upjohn case law is helpful in identifying the issues that survived that
decision and continue to confront litigants and courts today.
1. Pre-Upjohn Cases and Former Employees.-While the debate
raged over which current corporate employees came within the privi-
lege, few reported decisions addressed the further issue of whether
former employees were sufficiently aligned with the corporate client
so that communications between corporate counsel and the former
employee would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. In
one instance, a federal district court used the subject matter test to
determine that a corporate attorney's notes of communications be-
tween corporate counsel and current employees were shielded from
the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corpo-
rate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could
secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the
scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of corporate structure, need
to know its contents.
Id.
63. The California Supreme Court, for example, has incorporated elements of the
control group and subject matter tests in 11 principles it has identified as relevant to
determining which current employees enjoy privileged communications with corporate
counsel. See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10 (Cal. 1964).
The California standard also has been applied to bring communications with former
employees within the scope of the privilege. See Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Tech-
nologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1987). For a comprehensive discussion of
alternative tests proposed by courts and scholars, see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucy-
rus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 254-56 (11. 1982). See also Williams, supra note 42.
64. The Harper & Row case, in which the Seventh Circuit adopted the subject matter
test, was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court in 1971. 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
According to one commentator, there is no way to tell if the four justices who favored
reversal did so because they believed the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the privi-
lege was erroneous or because they thought the use of the extraordinary writ of manda-
mus was inappropriate to determine such an issue. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn
Consideration of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 453 n.38 (1982).
65. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
66. See generally Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1987); Sexton, supra note 64; Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MIcH. L.
REV. 665 (1983).
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discovery by both the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine, while similar materials generated by communications with
former employees were protected by the work product doctrine
alone.67
The dearth of decisions regarding former employees and the
attorney-client privilege does not necessarily mean that the issue
was not prevalent; rather, it may mean that it was frequently re-
solved through terse, interlocutory discovery orders or private
agreements between counsel that are not memorialized in reported
cases or electronic databases.6" One may surmise that any court
that strictly adhered to the control group test would hold that no
privilege existed, because a former employee is not in a position to
exert any control over the corporation's decision-making process.
On the other hand, a court that applied the more expansive "subject
matter" test would be more inclined to include the former employee
in the definition of "client." But even this test arguably prevented
the attorney-client privilege from attaching to communication be-
tween corporate counsel and former employees, due to its require-
ment that the employee be under orders from her supervisor to
communicate with corporate counsel. Thus, the control group, sub-
ject matter, and even hybrid tests offered no definitive standards for
application of the attorney-client privilege to former employees of a
party.
2. The Upjohn Decision.-Recognizing that lower courts were
using conflicting standards for determining the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege in the corporate context, the Supreme Court in
1981 granted certiorari in Upjohn6 9 to resolve this debate. The
Court rejected the control group test, but it did so without expressly
adopting either the subject matter or any other previously articu-
lated test. 70 The Court also expressly declined to address the issue
of whether the attorney-client privilege extends to communications
between a former employee and counsel for the employer. 7 1 Be-
67. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373-75
(E.D. Wis. 1979).
68. The absence of appellate court decisions may also be attributable to hesitation
by counsel to file, and reluctance of the courts to entertain, expensive and time-consum-
ing interlocutory appeals of discovery orders pursuant to a writ of mandamus or other
extraordinary writ. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court, 881 F.2d
1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1989); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1987); Sporck v.
Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314-25 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
69. 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
70. See id. at 392-97.
71. See id. at 394 n.3.
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cause the Court's decision involves a detailed analysis of the attor-
ney-client privilege in the corporate sphere, Upjohn naturally serves
as the point of departure for courts struggling to apply the privilege
in that context, whether to current or former employees.
Upjohn's general counsel was informed that one of its subsidi-
aries might have made illegal payments to a foreign government to
secure business.7 2 An internal investigation of the matter was con-
ducted under the supervision of the general counsel; the first phase
consisted of sending questionnaires to all foreign managers. 73 In
addition to being instructed to provide detailed information in re-
sponse to the inquiries posed, respondents were told to treat the
investigation as highly confidential and to return their completed
forms directly to corporate counsel. The second part of the investi-
gation involved interviews by corporate and outside counsel of
seventy-nine current and seven former company officers and
74employees.
Upjohn voluntarily submitted a report containing the results of
its investigation to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Se-
curities Exchange Commission (SEC), triggering further investiga-
tion by the IRS. The company provided the IRS with a list of all
former and current employees interviewed by corporate counsel,
but refused, on attorney-client privilege and work product grounds,
to comply with an IRS summons that sought production of all files
of corporate counsel, including the questionnaire responses and the
attorneys' notes and memoranda from the interviews. 75 The district
court ordered the materials produced on the grounds that the cor-
poration had waived the attorney-client privilege by making some
disclosures to the SEC and the IRS.76 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on waiver, but lim-
ited the applicable privilege to communications between counsel
and officers and agents responsible for directing the corporation's
actions in response to legal advice-i.e., the "control group."-
77
Although cognizant of the many "important questions concern-
ing the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate con-
text,"-78 a virtually unanimous Supreme Court expressly declined to
72. Id. at 386-87.
73. Id. at 387.
74. Id. at 394 n.3.
75. Id. at 387-88.
76. See id. at 388.
77. Id. at 388-89; see also United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (1979).
78. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
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furnish comprehensive guidance on these questions.79 One of the
key issues the Court explicitly declined to address was whether a
former employee of a corporation would be covered by the attor-
ney-client privilege."0 True to its declared intent to issue a narrow
opinion, the Court focused primarily upon whether the attorney-cli-
ent privilege should be defined in the corporate context by the
"control group" test.8 '
In rejecting the control group definition, the Court first ob-
served that an advocate's ability to provide meaningful legal advice
is premised "upon being fully informed by the client."8a 2 Limiting
the attorney-client privilege to those in the upper echelons of man-
agement, the Court reasoned,
overlooks the fact that the privilege seeks to protect not
only the giving of professional advice to those who can act
on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice. The first
step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining
the factual background and sifting through the facts with
an eye toward the legally relevant.8 "
A further justification offered by the Court for rejecting the
control group test was that middle- and lower-level employees are
often responsible for embroiling the corporation in serious legal dif-
ficulties in the first instance; thus, their input is needed for corpo-
rate counsel to provide fully informed legal advice.8 4 The Court
also perceived the control group test as difficult to apply8 5 and as
inappropriately limiting the flow of information between lower-level
employees and corporate counsel charged.with ensuring the corpo-
ration's compliance with various laws and regulations governing
corporate action."
In response to the concern that expansion of the privilege to
79. See id. ChiefJustice Burger wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the Court's
rejection of the control group test, but advocating a more expansive opinion by the
Court to provide guidance to attorneys and the courts regarding the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege in the corporate universe. See id. at 402-04 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
80. The Court reasoned that neither court below had addressed the issue. See id. at
394 n.3.
81. The Court also addressed work product issues raised by the IRS summons. See
id. at 397-402. For this aspect of the decision, see infra Part IV.
82. 449 U.S. at 389.
83. Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 391.
85. See id. at 393.
86. See id. at 392.
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those outside the control group would create an impenetrable
"zone of silence" shielding critical information from discovery, the
Court noted that the privilege only protects the content of the com-
munications between corporate counsel and employees, and not the
facts underlying those communications.87 Thus, because the IRS
had a list of Upjohn employees interviewed by corporate counsel,
the IRS could interview them to obtain relevant facts; the conven-
ience to the IRS of obtaining corporate counsel's questionnaires
and interview notes for these employees did not, in the Court's
view, "overcome the policies served by the attorney-client
privilege."88
The Court was also impressed by the precise circumstances sur-
rounding the gathering of the information by Upjohn's counsel.
The communications between employees and counsel were made at
the direction of corporate superiors for the purpose of securing
legal advice; relevant information was possessed by those who were
not within upper-level management; the information sought con-
cerned actions that were within the scope of the employees' respec-
tive duties; the employees knew that they were being questioned so
that the corporation could obtain legal advice; and the employees
were advised that the communications, especially questionnaire re-
sponses, were classified as "highly confidential."89 By articulating
these factors as relevant to its decision, the Court implicitly ap-
proved the modified subject matter test, including the caveat that
the communications be treated as confidential within the
corporation.
Chief Justice Burger, in his lone concurrence, stated that the
Court's opinion failed to afford sufficient guidance "to corporations,
counsel advising them, and federal courts" confronted with attor-
ney-client privilege issues." The Chief Justice preferred to articu-
late a general rule that "a communication is privileged at least when,
as here, an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of
management with an attorney regarding conduct within the scope of
employment. ' '91
87. See id. at 395.
88. Id. at 396.
89. Id. at 394.
90. Id. at 402 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
91. Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger further suggested
that:
[t]he attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the
subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of
the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has
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3. Post-Upjohn Decisions.-The major impact of Upjohn has
been the abandonment of the control group test by federal courts.92
Yet, the Court's articulated rationale for its narrow holding has re-
sulted in an expansive interpretation of the decision by lower courts.
Specifically, the Court's emphasis on the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege as an important implement for encouraging the flow
of information to the attorney93 has resulted in a broad application
of the attorney-client privilege. 4 Carried to its logical conclusion,
however, attaching undue significance to this single rationale for the
privilege would shield from discovery any communication between
corporate counsel and other individuals-even persons possessing
no current or former affiliation with the corporation-provided that
the other individuals were supplying information necessary to en-
able the attorney "to give sound and informed advice" 95 to her cli-
ent.96 Allowing the privilege to cast such a wide net would, of
course, eliminate the traditional requirement that only communica-
bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if
any, of that conduct, or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions
that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id.
The ChiefJustice's proposed rule is in accord with the majority's holding in Upjohn
with two important exceptions: the addition of "former employees" to the scope of the
privilege, and the omission of a requirement that the confidentiality of the communica-
tions be maintained by the corporation.
92. Most courts have concluded that Upjohn rejected the control group test. But see
Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (in-
terpreting Upjohn as "broadening" rather than rejecting the control group test); Wright
v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (interpreting Upjohn
as adopting "a flexible 'client' test extending coverage to many nonmanagerial
employees").
93. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
94. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)
(viewing Upjohn as holding that flow of information to attorney is a critical function of
attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984); In reJohn Doe Corp. v. United
States, 675 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1982); Command Transp. Inc. v. Y.S. Line (USA)
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 96-97 (D. Mass. 1987) (noting that Upjohn did not address the
former employee situation, but citing the Upjohn Court's emphasis on fostering the flow
of information to corporate counsel as supporting its conclusion that communications
between former employee and corporate party's counsel were privileged); see also Sex-
ton, supra note 64, at 459 (characterizing the Upjohn test as asking whether "application
of the privilege under the circumstances of this particular case foster the flow of infor-
mation to corporate counsel regarding issues about which corporations seek legal
advice").
95. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
96. The Upjohn Court elaborated: "The first step in the resolution of any legal prob-
lem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to-
ward the legally relevant." Id. at 390-91.
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tions between an attorney and her client are privileged, and effec-
tively create an "attorney communication privilege."
Although courts have not stretched Upjohn to such an extreme,
it is ironic that while the Upjohn Court unequivocally refused to "lay
down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable ques-
tions,"97 and in fact expressly declined to determine whether former
employees fell within the scope of the privilege, lower courts imme-
diately began to read Upjohn as allowing for a more expansive scope
of the privilege in the corporate context. Indeed, once freed from
the restrictive shackles of the control group test, many federal
courts did not hesitate to include communications between corpo-
rate counsel and former employees within the attorney-client privi-
lege.9 8 Whether such a broad reading of Upjohn misconstrues the
proper scope of the attorney-client privilege requires an assessment
of post-Upjohn case law.
a. Federal Law.-The broadening of the attorney-client privi-
lege resulting from Upjohn is dramatically illustrated by opinions
filed by a California federal district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in a series of cases, consolidated for discovery
purposes, involving allegations of an antitrust conspiracy by major
oil companies.99 These petroleum antitrust decisions did not
97. Id. at 386.
98. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493
(9th Cir. 1989) (reaffirming In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982), which extended Upjohn to former employees
and further expanded scope of privilege to communications between employee of sub-
sidiary and counsel of parent corporation); Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 124 F.R.D.
665, 687 (D. Kan. 1989) (making no distinction between communications between cor-
porate counsel and current and former employees and holding that all such communica-
tions are "doubly nondiscoverable" under the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine); Amarin Plastics Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 41 (D.
Mass. 1987) (noting that "the communications between a former employee and a corpo-
rate party's counsel may be privileged" and that no cases had come to the court's atten-
tion that held a contrary view); Command Transp., 116 F.R.D. at 96-97 (stating that the
Upjohn rationale of fostering flow of information to corporate counsel justified extension
of privilege to communications between corporate party counsel and former employee);
Mickel v. Huntington Bank of Toledo, No. L-82-099, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 2,
1982) (citing Upjohn as clearly indicating that the attorney-client privilege extends to
communications between former employee and corporate counsel). But see Henderson
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 510 (N.D. Il. 1986) (viewing Upjohn
as expanding rather than rejecting the control group test, and holding that former em-
ployee was not covered by the privilege because she could not bind the corporation
when employed, or after termination).
99. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Liti-
gation, 502 F. Supp. 1092 (C.D. Cal. 1980), vacated, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. California v. Standard Oil Co., 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
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squarely confront the issue of informal discovery of former employ-
ees; facially, the decisions only resolve plaintiffs' motion to disqual-
ify corporate defense counsel from representing current and former
employees whose formal depositions plaintiffs had noticed. How-
ever, these opinions provide insights into the competing interests at
stake when discovery is sought from current and former employees,
as well as the impact of Upjohn on the appellate court's decision.
The district court first set the stage for its discourse on the ap-
plicability of the attorney-client privilege:
In these cases, which charge major oil companies with
having conspired to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States, the plaintiffs (Attorneys General of several states)
currently are in the process of noticing the depositions of
employees and retired employees of the defendant corpo-
rations. It often happens that when such a prospective de-
ponent receives a subpoena for his deposition, or
otherwise learns he is a target of inquiry, he, understanda-
bly, contacts an appropriate representative of his employer
(or former employer) and inquires as to what the dispute is
all about and where he fits into the picture. He promptly is
referred to the firm of attorneys that are representing the
company in these actions and, from the first interview, it is
mutually and tacitly inferred that an attorney-client rela-
tionship had been established, at no cost to him, which car-
ries through the preparation for the deposition and its
accomplishment. 100
After classifying the current and former oil company employees
as nonparty, independent witnesses "whose duty and only appropri-
ate objective is to tell 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth,' "101 the district court articulated numerous reasons for
sustaining plaintiffs' motion, predicated on the argument that plain-
tiffs were impermissibly prejudiced by a process that allowed de-
fense counsel to establish an attorney-client relationship with, and
represent during depositions, the corporation's current and former
employees. The court's primary concern was that a conflict would
arise during an employee's deposition because the employee wit-
ness's desire to tell the truth would not harmonize with the attor-
ney's objective of creating a favorable record for the client
corporation; thus, "the possibility cannot be discounted that the at-
torney may become faced with the need to impeach the testimony of
100. Petroleum Products, 502 F. Supp. at 1095.
101. Id.
19921
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his own client."'' 0 2
The court expressed additional ethical and pragmatic concerns
militating against allowing corporate counsel to represent current
and former employees of a party. These included: (1) the potential
for explicit or implicit solicitation of the employees as clients by cor-
porate counsel; 10 3 (2) insulation of the employees by corporate
counsel, preventing plaintiffs' attorneys from informally contacting
the employees to identify individuals who possessed sufficient infor-
mation to warrant the scheduling of a deposition; 0 4 (3) the bar that
application of an attorney-client privilege would create to inquiries
of plaintiffs' counsel into the contents of discussions between corpo-
rate counsel and employees, including discourse stemming from the
review of documents during predeposition "orientation ses-
sions;' 0 5 and (4) the possibility of excessive disruptions during the
employees' depositions resulting from corporate counsel's objec-
tions made primarily to protect the corporate client.'0 6 Considering
the above factors, the court decided that representation of current
and former employees by corporate counsel would, at a minimum,
include inherent conflicts of interest that could create the appear-
ance of professional impropriety. 0 7 Accordingly, the court disqual-
ified corporate defense counsel from representing defendants'
current and former employees during depositions.'0 8
The petroleum antitrust defendants pursued an interlocutory
appeal on the disqualification issue, and the Supreme Court's
Upjohn decision was released while the appeal was pending.
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
appearance of impropriety could serve as a basis to disqualify coun-
sel, ' 9 it disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the spectre
of inappropriate conduct automatically accompanied corporate
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1096. The court further explained that because the initial contact be-
tween the employee and corporate counsel might take place before the employee even
realizes the need to seek legal counsel, the contact might be viewed as solicitation. See
id.
104. See id. at 1096-97.
105. See id. at 1097. The court noted that corporate counsel could still prepare em-
ployees for their depositions, but found the shielding of these orientation sessions by
the attorney-client privilege inappropriate: "[I]t must be remembered that they are not
parties, and it is in the interests ofjustice that both sides be entitled to their testimony
and be able to make full inquiry into any influences that may have affected such testi-
mony." Id.
106. See id. at 1097-98.
107. See id. at 1098.
108. See id.
109. See Petroleum Products, 658 F.2d at 1361.
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counsels' representation during depositions of defendants' current
and former employees."' The circuit court reached this result by
interpreting Upjohn as virtually eliminating all of the trial court's
concerns; in fact, it hypothesized that "the district court would have
ruled the other way if Upjohn had been decided before the district
court had to act" on the disqualification motion.
More precisely, the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasons articu-
lated by the trial court for prohibiting corporate counsel from repre-
senting the employees during their respective depositions.
Regarding the potential for solicitation of clients by corporate coun-
sel, it stated that such solicitation,
even if it could be substantiated, does not cut to the heart
of the integrity of the system so as to require the court to
take drastic steps to safeguard the image of the judicial
process in the eyes of the public. Moreover, we note that in
light of Upjohn, the definition of solicitation in the corpo-
rate-counsel context is altered." 12
The court conceded that corporate counsel's "pre-deposition insu-
lation" of the employees caused inconvenience and frustration, but
found this ground insufficient to "warrant interference with a right
to counsel.""' The potential disruption caused by corporate coun-
sel's instruction to an employee to refuse to answer a question dur-
ing a deposition could be resolved, according to the circuit court,
through "judicious use of sanctions" or predeposition instructions
from the trial court on how to conduct the depositions."'
Regarding the trial court's concern that whatever transpired be-
tween corporate counsel and current and former employees during
the predeposition "orientation sessions" would be inappropriately
shielded from discovery, the circuit court found no difficulty in ex-
tending Upjohn's scope of attorney-client privilege to former em-
ployees as well as current ones." l 5 The court reasoned:
Although Upjohn was specifically limited to current em-
ployees, the same rationale applies to the ex-employees.
... Former employees, as well as current employees, may
possess the relevant information needed by corporate
counsel to advise the client with respect to actual or poten-
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1361 n.7.
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tial difficulties. Again, the attorney-client privilege is
served by the certainty that conversations will remain privi-
leged after the employee leaves. Although no findings
were made, it is clear that at least some of the conversa-
tions referred to by the district court were made to counsel
for the companies in order to secure legal advice for the
company. The orientation sessions undoubtedly provided
information which will be used by corporate counsel in ad-
vising the companies how to handle the pending lawsuit." 6
The Ninth Circuit's cavalier conclusion that Upjohn eliminated
all of the possible ethical and pragmatic ramifications that arise
when corporate defense counsel prepare former corporate employ-
ees for their depositions and represent them during the depositions
presents problems on several levels. The court's summary disposal
of the many issues involved without mention of countervailing con-
siderations causes immediate concern. The court relied to a dis-
turbing degree upon the relative value to the attorney of the
information that the former employees possess as determinative of
whether the attorney-client privilege attaches. As previously noted,
Upjohn specifically cited the free flow of information to the attorney
as a reason to reject the narrow constraints of the control group
test;" 7 however, Upjohn cannot be read, as the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion implies, as extending the privilege to communications between
corporate counsel and anyone who possesses factual information
that the attorney finds helpful in advising the corporation.
In truth, Upjohn does not even begin to reach all the issues illu-
minated by the district court in the petroleum antitrust disqualifica-
tion opinion. Contrary to the circuit court's reading, Upjohn does
not even mention, much less resolve, the solicitation issue." 8
Upjohn does not address any issues relating to former employees,
such as the pragmatic and ethical concern that corporate counsel
may intentionally or unintentionally coach the former employees
during informal interviews or deposition preparation sessions, se-
lectively refreshing the individual's recollections and suggesting re-
sponses to anticipated questions in a manner consistent with the
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. 499 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981); see supra text accompanying note 85.
118. It is clear that the concern expressed by the district court in the petroleum anti-
trust litigation regarding solicitation by corporate counsel survived Upjohn. See, e.g.,
United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1470, 1474-77 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
(allowing counsel for corporate party to represent nonparty former employees during
depositions, but prohibiting corporate counsel from initiating contact with former em-
ployees for the purpose of offering legal services).
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corporation's theories of defense. While this same situation can no
doubt occur when current employees are represented by defense
counsel, often a significant amount of time has elapsed since the
former employees have experienced day-to-day familiarity with the
corporation's operations, thus making them even more vulnerable
to suggestion. Because the purpose of discovery is to establish the
relevant facts as the witnesses recall them, rather than recreate the
facts as the attorneys desire them to be, the importance of reexam-
ining these questions, rather than prematurely attributing their de-
mise to Upjohn, cannot be underestimated.
b. State Law.-Uninhibited by the Supreme Court's decisions
on issues involving the attorney-client privilege," 9 post-Upjohn deci-
sions of state courts and actions of state legislatures have reflected
less willingness to expand the attorney-client privilege past the con-
trol group in the corporate setting. 120 In State v. Jancsek, 12 1 for ex-
119. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie, 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982)
(comparing federal jurisprudence of attorney-client privilege in corporate context, in-
cluding Supreme Court's Upjohn decision, to Illinois precedent, and reaffirming control
group test as law of Illinois).
120. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1001-02 nn.4-5 (Alaska 1988)
(noting that the definition of "representative of a client" contained in Alaska's codified
version of the attorney-client privilege limits coverage of the privilege to the control
group in the corporate setting); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Technologies, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 89, 93-94 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that California Evidence Code requires
showing that individual must be "authorized representative" of the corporation for com-
munications between that individual and corporate counsel to be privileged, and former
employee is not an "authorized representative"); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1745, 1759 (D.D.C. 1986) (re-
quiring showing that communications for which attorney-client privilege is claimed were
part of control group efforts to secure legal advice; contrary ruling would mean that
"every memorandum and conversation between a corporate employee and corporate
counsel could be confidential, which would expand the privilege far beyond its bounds
and unnecessarily frustrate the efforts of others to discover corporate activity"); Consoli-
dation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 258 (retaining control group test despite Supreme Court's
criticisms in Upjohn); see also Leer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305, 308-
09 (Minn. 1981) (discussing control group, subject matter, and Weinstein tests, but not
adopting a particular test; however, court's holding that "[t]he attorney client privilege
does not encompass communications which are within an employee's knowledge solely
because he witnessed an accident" at work appears to align most closely with control
group test), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); United States Ins. Group v. T.B. Campbell
Inc., No. 01-90-00754-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 3047, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
1990) (observing that "[n]o Texas court has decided whether Texas follows the subject
matter or control group test," and declining to make that decision because the commu-
nication at issue failed to meet the criteria for privilege under either test). But see Denver
Post Corp. v. University of Colo., 739 P.2d 874, 880 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) ("We apply
the Supreme Court's rationale in Upjohn to cover communications between counsel and
former employees of the client which concern activities during their period of
employment.").
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ample, the Oregon Supreme Court recounted the extensive debate
between members of state committees charged with evidentiary re-
form on the issue of whether the statutory phrase "representative of
the client" should carry with it a control group or subject matter
definition in the corporate attorney-client privilege context.' 22 The
control group test ultimately was selected based upon the rationale
that "the restrictive view brings the corporate privilege more in line
with the privilege available to unincorporated business concerns,"
and because "[a] more permissive privilege would result in suppres-
sion of information conveyed to attorneys by employees who are
more like witnesses than clients and who have no personal desire for
confidentiality." 
3
Like the Oregon legislature, the Illinois Supreme Court was not
sufficiently impressed by Upjohn to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege to employees outside the control group. In Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. ,124 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the
competing social policies in force when the attorney-client privilege
is examined in the corporate context. Of the two primary policies at
stake-encouraging full and frank communication between a client
and his legal advisor, and providing for liberal discovery-the court
viewed unhampered discovery as the more compelling policy. Al-
lowing the privilege to create a bar to discovery of masses of corpo-
rate documents and information possessed by numerous employees,
the court opined, "is fundamentally incompatible with this State's
broad discovery policies looking to the ultimate ascertainment of
the truth, which we continue to find essential to the fair disposition
of a lawsuit."121 In the eyes of the judges deciding Consolidation Coal,
the control group test strikes "a reasonable balance by protecting
consultations with counsel by those who are the decision makers or
who substantially influence corporate decisions and by minimizing
the amount of relevant factual material which is immune from
discovery."' 126
Contrary to Upjohn's characterization of the control group test
as "difficult to apply in practice,"' 2 7 Illinois' highest court praised
the control group test for its "predictability and ease of applica-
121. 730 P.2d 14 (Or. 1986).
122. See id. at 18-21.
123. Id. at 20.
124. 432 N.E.2d 250 (Il. 1982).
125. Id. at 257 (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
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tion." 12 8 The court further observed that the labels or titles of em-
ployees are not determinative: the actual duties and responsibilities
of the employees dictate their status as decision makers who are
members of the control group.' 29 Recognizing "that decisionmak-
ing within a corporation is a process rather than a final act,"'13 0 the
Consolidation Coal court offered further clarification of which employ-
ees fall within the control group:
[A]n employee whose advisory role to top manage-
ment in a particular area is such that a decision would not
normally be made without his advice or opinion, and whose
opinion in fact forms that basis of any final decision by
those with actual authority, is properly within the control
group. However, the individuals upon whom he may rely
on for information are not members of the control group.
Thus, if an employee is consulted for the purpose of deter-
mining what legal action the corporation will pursue, his
communication is protected from disclosure.'13
The focus of the Consolidation Coal control group test, then, is
"on individual people who substantially influenced decisions, not on
facts that substantially influenced decisions."''3 2 In effect, the con-
trol group test recognizes two tiers of corporate employees whose
communications with counsel are not discoverable: top manage-
ment decisionmakers comprise the first tier, while employees who
directly advise top management, and upon whose advice top man-
agement relies in making its decision, comprise the second tier.'
3 3
Employees' communications that consist of purely factual data are
excluded if the communications contain no suggestions on how the
decisionmakers should act in response to such information. I13 Pre-
sumably, other communications would also be excluded, including
those that are primarily factual in nature but that contain merely
128. Consolidation Coal, 432 N.E.2d at 257.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 258.
131. Id.
132. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., 485 N.E.2d 1301, 1304 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).
133. See Mlynarski v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., No. 1-90-0778, slip
op. at 3 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 29, 1991).
134. See Archer Daniels Midland Co., 485 N.E.2d at 1304 (holding that Illinois attorney-
client privilege did not bar production of report, prepared by senior corporate engineer
at the request of counsel, that addressed the structural strengths of a storage facility
manufactured by the corporation, because engineer merely supplied factual data to top
management and had no role in management's decision to send notices to customers
based on results of report).
2671992]
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gratuitous advice from an employee who is neither in top manage-
ment nor one upon whom top management normally relies for ad-
vice in making decisions.
The Consolidation Coal court's formulation of the control group
test leaves little doubt that the privilege does not shield communica-
tions between former employees and corporate counsel from dis-
covery in any jurisdiction that embraces that test, because a former
employee would not be in a position to guide management's deci-
sions. As one court observed, ruling that even communications be-
tween a former employee retained as a consultant to the litigation
and corporate counsel were not privileged:
Former employees are not the client. They share no
identity of interest in the outcome of the litigation. Their
willingness to provide information is unrelated to the di-
rections of their former corporate superiors, and they have
no duty to their former employer to provide such informa-
tion. It is virtually impossible to distinguish the position of
an employee from any other third party who might have
pertinent information about one or more corporate parties
to the lawsuit. 135
B. A Proposal for a Bright Line Test
In light of the foregoing discussion, a general rule excluding
communications between former employees and a corporate party's
counsel from the attorney-client privilege appears to be an appro-
priate means for reconciling the conflicting state and federal juris-
prudence on the issue.' 36 In addition to the inherent value and ease
of a bright line test,' 3 7 numerous other substantive reasons support
135. Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 517 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82-C-4585, slip op. at 12
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1985)).
136. The proposed rule would not necessarily prohibit a former employee from re-
taining the same counsel representing the former employer and thus creating a separate
attorney-client relationship on which assertions of the privilege legitimately could be
based. Courts might, however, carefully scrutinize such situations to determine whether
the former employee sought the representation (rather than being solicited by corporate
counsel), whether conflicts of interests exist or may arise during the course of the litiga-
tion, and whether circumstances suggest that any other appearance of impropriety may
attach to corporate counsel's dual representation. The conflicts that may surface due to
dual representation may not be apparent at the outset of the litigation. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (conflict arose when corpo-
ration wished to waive privilege regarding communications between employees and cor-
porate counsel, and employees wished to maintain the privilege).
137. See James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431, 436 (1985)
(arguing that in comparison to use of balancing tests, bright line standards "are easier to
268 [VOL. 51:239
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the validity of such a test. 138
First, excluding former employees from the privilege does not
inhibit the objective of encouraging a freely flowing stream of infor-
mation to the corporate attorney. Absent potential individual liabil-
ity on the part of the former employee," 9 there is no reason to
suspect that the former employee will not be candid regarding her
knowledge of relevant facts due to a fear that the content of her
communications with corporate counsel will be disclosed in the
future.
Second, shielding communications between the former em-
ployee and the corporate party's counsel under the attorney-client
privilege creates a problematic, absolute bar to ascertaining the de-
gree of intentional or unintentional "coaching" of the former em-
administer, afford greater predictability, limit unwanted discretion, and provide greater
certainty and thus better notice").
138. There may be some wisdom in adopting a rule prohibiting a corporate party's
counsel from representing former employees during depositions. A conflict between
the corporation's theory of the case and the testimony of the former employee may arise
during the deposition. When this occurs, corporate counsel's method of dealing with
such a situation is often to fire a string of (arguably unfounded) objections in an effort to
derail the line of inquiry. As explained supra note 136, conflicts of interest can also
surface regarding waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Because the privilege belongs
to the client, the former employee has the right to waive the privilege regarding commu-
nications with his attorney that occurred, for example, during deposition preparation. It
is doubtful that the former employee's amenability to waiving the privilege and discuss-
ing the details of the deposition preparation sessions would be in the best interest of the
corporate client. On the other hand, a rule prohibiting a former employee from being
represented by corporate counsel may present a substantial economic burden on the
employee by forcing him to retain independent counsel. Absence of legal counsel might
result in the ex-employee making unintended admissions due to his lack of sophistica-
tion in the deposition process, or it could intimidate him into silence.
139. If a former employee faces individual liability relating to the events or transac-
tion underlying the litigation, that individual may be or become a party whose interests
are directly contrary to those of the corporate party. In this situation, the former em-
ployee would be forced to retain counsel separate from corporate counsel and could
not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered a client or representative of the
corporate client for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege. If, however, the former
employee is named as a party and no conflict exists, then the former employee could
retain the corporate counsel or her own counsel. Even if she retains separate counsel,
communications between the former employee and corporate counsel may be shielded
from discovery under what is routinely referred to as the "joint defense privilege." See
generally Patricia Welles, A Survey of 4ttorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 321 (1981); Susan V. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint Defense Doctrine From the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1989). Although this privilege originated
in the criminal context, it has also been applied in civil cases involving multiple counsel
for plaintiffs as well as multiple defense counsel. See, e.g., Schachar v. American Acad-
emy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187, 192-93 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (bringing within
the joint privilege confidential communications between parties with common interests
as plaintiffs).
HeinOnline  -- 51 Md. L. Rev. 269 1992
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ployee by corporate counsel. As previously noted, a substantial
amount of time may have passed since the events at issue oc-
curred.' 40 The former employee may also have a strong desire to
aid his former employer in the litigation, stemming either from a
sense of loyalty to friends and acquaintances currently employed by
the corporation or from pecuniary considerations, such as pension
and health benefits, still provided by the corporation, or both. Such
factors make the former employee especially susceptible to subtle
(and not so subtle) "gap-filling" suggestions offered by corporate
counsel. If the attorney-client privilege does not attach, opposing
counsel may freely inquire into the content of the exchanges be-
tween corporate counsel and the former employee, thus revealing
the extent, if any, to which counsel has coached or even coerced the
witness.
Third, the ethical clouds surrounding the potential solicitation
of the former employee by counsel for the corporate party evapo-
rate if the bright line test is adopted. Under the murky standards
now governing the application of the attorney-client privilege to for-
mer employees, a corporate attorney conceivably may initiate con-
tact with the former employee, conduct an interview, and then, if the
interview is favorable, extend an offer to represent the employee in
any matter related to the litigation. If the former employee accepts
the offer, the content of the communications between the former
employee and corporate counsel-including the communication in
which the attorney actually solicited the employee-is insulated
from discovery because of the attorney-client relationship created at
that meeting. 141 At a minimum, adoption of the proposed rule
would eliminate the spectre of improper solicitation that arises in
such situations, because the content of the communications would
be fully discoverable.1
42
Fourth, the policy goal of narrowly tailoring the attorney-client
privilege will be well-served by a rule refusing to extend the privi-
140. See supra text accompanying notes 118-119.
141. In fact, the meeting can be covered by the privilege even if the employee declines
representation by corporate counsel, as long as the employee was considering seeking
corporate counsel's legal advice when the meeting occurred. See, e.g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The fiduciary
relationship existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultation by a
prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment
does not result.").
142. No ethical violation occurs where the former employee actually initiated contact
with corporate counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice. See D.S. Magazines, Inc.
v. Warner Publisher Servs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 624, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In the author's
experience, this scenario is extremely rare.
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lege to a former employee who, as discussed above, cannot be fairly
viewed as either a "client" or a "representative of a client."' 43
Finally, the exclusion of communications between corporate
counsel and a former employee from the attorney-client privilege
will not leave the corporate attorney's theory of the case and general
strategy completely open for inquiry by the other side. To the con-
trary, the work product doctrine still shields from discovery the
notes, memoranda, and other documents prepared by the attorney
during or after meetings with the former employees. 144 Further,
certain facts known by the former employee that come to light dur-
ing an interview between corporate counsel and the former em-
ployee are shielded from discovery if they consist of trade secrets or
other material proprietary to the corporation. 145
III. ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON OPPOSING COUNSEL'S
COMMUNICATIONS WITH A PARTY'S FORMER EMPLOYEES
A. The Current Dilemma
At the same time that corporate counsel wrestles with whether
the content of her communication with former employees is
shielded by the attorney-client privilege, opposing counsel faces an
equally contentious dilemma: Is he ethically constrained from con-
sulting former employees at all? The correct response to this in-
quiry has been widely debated, providing opposite judicial
pronouncements even within the same jurisdiction."' 6 The weight
143. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text. The narrowly tailored approach
is favored not only in the attorney-client context, but also in the context of privileges
covering communications between spouses, priest and penitent, and doctor and patient.
See United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1985).
144. See infra Part IV.
145. See American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 1991) (en-
joining former employee from divulging information classified as "trade secrets" under
Ohio statute where he sought to exploit information gained during employment as engi-
neer and attorney with American Motors Corporation (AMC) by marketing himself as an
expert witness for plaintiffs in lawsuits involving AMC Jeeps); PPG Indus., Inc. v. BASF
Corp., 134 F.R.D. 118, 122 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (recognizing that former employee's knowl-
edge of trade secrets would in some cases be immune from discovery during informal ex
parte interview, but former employer's claim that trade secrets had already been re-
vealed rendered the need for such protection moot); In re Home Shopping Network, Inc.
Securities Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,950, at 95,284 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (al-
lowing ex parte interviews, but ordering plaintiffs counsel to remind former employees
prior to interview that they remained bound by confidentiality agreement regarding
trade secrets executed during employment).
146. Compare Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (PSE&G) v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins.
Servs., Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990) (prohibiting informal contacts with
party's former employees) with Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J.
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of authority interprets Model Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 4 7 or its predecessor,
Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A) (1), 148 to hold that such contact is not per
se improper. 49 Nonetheless, the validity of arguments supporting
the opposite result also has been readily acknowledged. 5 ' Further,
there is no uniform federal common law on this subject; rather, fed-
eral courts often apply the ethical rules and standards adopted by
the state in which the court sits.'
5
'
1991) (permitting counsel's ex parte contact with opposing party's former employees
under ethical rules). For further discussion of this disagreement, see infra Subpart III.D.
147. For the text of Model Rule 4.2, see infra text accompanying note 164.
148. The Disciplinary Rule requires that:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that mat-
ter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party
or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-104(A)(1).
149. For decisions concluding that Model Rule 4.2 is not applicable to former em-
ployees, and that contact therefore may be made, see, e.g., University Patents, Inc. v.
Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp.
1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986); Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. California, 261 Cal. Rptr.
493, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (N.Y. 1990)
(interpreting DR 104(A)(1)). Other courts have held that contact with ex-employees is
permissible unless the acts or omissions of the employee in question are imputable to
the corporation. See, e.g., Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36,
40-41 (D. Mass. 1987) (finding a former employer's "conclusory assertion" of imputa-
tion of liability insufficient to invoke Rule 4.2); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp.
250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988). Ex parte contacts have also been deemed improper where
former employees possess privileged information. See Polycast Technology Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Extensive searches of electronic
databases and hardcopy materials revealed no decisions rendered by federal circuit
courts on the subject. In its unpublished decision, American Protective Ins. Co. v. MGM
Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1984), the Ninth
Circuit interpreted Model Rule 4.2 as a bar to ex parte contact with former employees.
As noted in Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 86 (D.N.J. 1991), how-
ever, that decision was subsequently vacated by the deciding court, rendering it of no
precedential value.
150. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359
(1991) (recognizing "that persuasive policy arguments can be and have been made for
extending" the rule prohibiting ex parte contact with a represented party to certain for-
mer employees of that party); Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 626 (observing that several courts
and commentators have suggested that ex parte contact with certain former employees
may be improper).
151. Federal law governs the conduct of attorneys in federal courts, In re Snyder, 472
U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985), and that law is usually elucidated in the local rules of each
federal district court. Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 624. Rather than authoring a distinct code
of conduct, however, many local rules incorporate by reference model codes adopted by
the state in which the court sits or the model codes promulgated by the ABA, or both.
See, e.g., id. (deciding that conduct of attorneys practicing before courts in Southern and
Eastern District of New York was governed by ABA or New York Bar Association). Fed-
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The significance of this matter to litigants and their counsel
cannot be overestimated. From the perspective of the attorney rep-
resenting a corporate party, giving opposing counsel free ex parte
access to the client's former employees is clearly undesirable. The
potential naivet6 of the former employees in legal matters renders
them vulnerable to opposing counsel's manipulations. This vulner-
ability may be especially intense where the individual bears animos-
ity toward the former employer due to the circumstances
surrounding the cessation of employment. Indeed, the former em-
ployee may perceive opposing counsel as a kindred spirit, whose in-
terests, like his own, are directly adverse to that of the former
employer. Even where the former employee maintains a neutral or
positive attitude regarding the former employer, the frailties of
human memory, 152 paired with the passage of time, render the indi-
vidual fair game for the manipulative tactic employed by opposing
counsel of coaching the individual on key facts under the guise of
"helping" him to remember. 53
Despite the foregoing, corporate counsel's desire to protect the
corporation's former employees from exposure to and potential ex-
ploitation by opposing counsel is often counterbalanced by the need
to distance the corporation from negative information and testi-
mony that ex-employees may offer regardless of opposing counsel's
influence. One indeed, testimony that runs contrary to the corpora-
tion's theory of the case may necessitate corporate counsel's attack
on the credibility of the individual's testimony by characterizing it as
that of a disgruntled former employee. One instance where corpo-
rate counsel desired both to control and disassociate former em-
ployees occurred in Dubois v. Gradco Systems, Inc. ,154 where corporate
counsel first informed plaintiff's counsel that it could not produce
seven employees for deposition because they were no longer em-
ployed by the company; corporate counsel filed a motion in limine
arguing that plaintiff's counsel should be prohibited by ethical con-
eral courts, however, are not bound by state interpretations of the applicable code. Id.
at 625.
152. As one scholar observes, "[m]emory is not like a phonograph record; the percep-
tion of an event does not leave a single, clear imprint that can be replayed precisely and
at will." Applegate, supra note 9, at 329; see also ISRAEL ROSENFIELD, THE INVENTION OF
MEMORY: A NEW VIEW OF THE BRAIN 3 (1988) (labeling as a "myth" the long-held belief
that people possess accurate memories).
153. Clearly, the potential for manipulation of any witness is not a concern just for
corporate counsel; rather, its repercussions resound to the very heart of the integrity of
our system of justice.
154. 136 F.R.D. 341 (D. Conn. 1991).
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straints from conducting informal interviews of the defendant's for-
mer employees. 5
5
Corporate counsel's efforts to protect the corporation's former
employees from exposure to opposing counsel should not, however,
be immediately construed as an attempt improperly to shield the
individuals from discovery because corporate counsel knows that
the testimony will be adverse to his client; rather, it is often corpo-
rate counsel's lack of knowledge regarding the former employee's
testimony, combined with a duty zealously to safeguard his corpo-
rate client's interests, that inspires a motion for a protective order.
Similarly, opposing counsel's decision to conduct ex parte inter-
views should not necessarily be construed as part of a sinister plot to
manipulate and coerce the testimony of interviewees. Rather, many
legitimate objectives can be accomplished during informal ex parte
interviews, including determining whether formal discovery is war-
ranted and obtaining a statement from the witness that later can be
used to refresh his memory or, in the extreme case, to impeach his
testimony. Opposing counsel's desire to conduct initial screening
interviews outside the presence of corporate counsel also reflects
another legitimate concern: "Former employees often have emo-
tional or economic ties to their former employer and would some-
times be reluctant to come forward with potentially damaging
information if they could only do so in the presence of the corpora-
tion's attorney.""'
B. Opposing Counsel's Unsatisfactory Options
The current state of the law provides at least four options to
counsel desiring to interview an opposing party's former employees,
and none is completely satisfactory. First, counsel can err on the
side of caution by conducting only formal discovery of an opposing
party's former employees, with the cost of the litigation increasing
substantially, both in attorney time and fees associated with the tak-
ing of depositions. This extra expense may in many instances be ill
spent, since one of the objectives of conducting informal interviews
is to determine which individuals possess knowledge that makes tak-
ing their depositions worthwhile. Second, counsel can ask corpo-
rate counsel's consent to conduct the interviews. In view of the
adversarial nature of litigation, as well as corporate counsel's duty to
protect her client's interests, such permission would rarely be forth-
155. See id. at 342-43.
156. Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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coming. 5 7 Third, the attorney can seek the court's approval of the
ex parte contacts prior to taking any action. As with the first option,
the additional time and expense involved in obtaining court inter-
vention on this discovery issue can be considerable, 58 and the re-
sults unsatisfactory. For example, a California trial court entered an
order forbidding ex parte contacts with former employees who had
been within the employer's control group. In response to counsel's
motion seeking clarification of which former employees fit within
the control group, the court dumped the dilemma back on the attor-
ney's doorstep by responding: "You have a choice. If you are sure
they are not [within the control group], you can interview them. If
you are wrong, you get sanctioned."' t59
Finally, there is the option that is routinely, yet perhaps improv-
idently, exercised: the attorney can conduct the interviews without
court approval or opposing counsel's knowledge or consent. As dis-
cussed more fully below, counsel choosing this option may find her-
self facing allegations that her actions constituted unethical and
unprofessional conduct, with the party or the attorney pressing the
charges seeking sanctions ranging from disqualification from repre-
157. Corporate counsel's reticence regarding ex parte contacts of a client's former
employees is undoubtedly based in part on the fear that opposing counsel will tape rec-
ord the interviews or obtain written statements from the former employees that can be
used as impeachment evidence if the employees change their respective stories at trial.
See, e.g., Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 562 (D. Utah 1990).
Even minor deviations between the story as told in the interview and the story as retold
at trial can be made to appear significant by a skilled trial attorney, thus seriously under-
mining the witness's credibility.
158. Under the authority delegated by the 1976 Amendments to the Magistrates Act
and local rules of court, discovery disputes are often adjudicated by a magistrate, whose
decisions can be appealed to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1976) (stat-
ing that "a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court"; the trial court can reconsider the magistrate's decision on a
pretrial issue only when it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law"); Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co. (PSE&G) v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1038
(D.NJ. 1990) (citing the Magistrates Act and a local rule of court as authority for magis-
trate's resolution of discovery disputes and further providing that such resolutions will
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or contrary to law).
159. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. California, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493, 497 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). An advisory opinion issued by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline for the Supreme Court of Ohio was similarly unhelpful; it condones ex parte
contacts with former employees unless the former employees "were privy to privileged
communications with the corporation's counsel," or were persons whose conduct
"[gave] rise to the claim against the corporation." 20 Op. Bd. of Comm'rs on Griev-
ances and Discipline for the Supreme Court of Ohio 4 (Aug. 17, 1990). While opposing
counsel's pre-suit investigation might well identify former employees falling within the
latter category, the question of whether a particular employee possesses privileged in-
formation arguably cannot be assessed without an interview.
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senting any of the parties in a particular case to a citation for con-
tempt of court.'
60
C. The Impact of Model Rule 4.2
Counsel's routine use of informal discovery of a party's former
employees presents special dangers because the ethical constraints
on ex parte contact with nonparties vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction.' 6 ' While no uniform rule has emerged that explicitly gov-
erns ex parte contact with a corporate party's former employees by
opposing counsel,' 62 a challenge to the propriety of ex parte com-
160. See, e.g., Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D. Mass.
1987) (in addition to a protective order governing opposing counsel's future conduct,
corporate counsel sought sanctions against opposing counsel for previous ex parte con-
tacts with corporate party's former employee); Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312,
313 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (corporate counsel sought contempt citation against opposing
counsel based on ex parte interviews that alleged he "breached his ethical duties and
disrupted the discovery process"); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (N.Y. 1990)
(noting that a lawyer may "risk disqualification or discipline because of uncertainty as to
which employees are covered by the rule and which not").
161. The State Bar Association of Alabama in 1887 was the first to draft and imple-
ment a professional code of attorney ethics. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23
(1953). The Supreme Court has long respected a state's important interest in regulating
the professional conduct of the attorneys whom it licenses, and thus has been extremely
hesitant to allow federal courts to interfere with state disciplinary rules and proceedings.
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-35
(1982). Even though states are free to develop their own codes of attorney conduct, the
American Bar Association (ABA) has been one of the strongest forces in shaping the
state ethical codes. The ABA adopted the Canons of Pr6fessional Ethics in 1908; those
rules were replaced in 1970 with the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations,
which were collectively referred to as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 31, at xiii. With the exception of California, every state
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, often with variations that were
more form than substance. Id. In 1977, the ABA's "Kutak Commission" began the
formidable task of preparing a new set of rules. d. On August 2, 1983, the ABA ap-
proved the version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that had been ham-
mered out by the Commission. Id. As of Fall, 1990, more than 30 states as well as the
District of Columbia had adopted all or part of the Model Rules. Id. at xiii-xiv. Some
states, including Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York, have specifically rejected the
Model Rules; other jurisdictions, like California and North Carolina, have incorporated
some of the Model Rules into their respective codes of conduct. Id. at xiv. In sum, while
the Model Rules have proven influential, the rules governing attorney conduct continue
to vary widely. d.
162. Although the subject of ex-employees is not directly mentioned, the ethical rules
of certain jurisdictions expressly allow opposing counsel to contact a party's current
employees if certain conditions are met. It is unlikely that ex parte contact with former
employees would be viewed as problematic in those jurisdictions, although the issue of
whether the same prerequisites must be followed might be an issue. In the District of
Columbia, for example, counsel may speak with a current, nonparty employee of an
opposing party, but must "disclose to such employee both the lawyer's identity and the
fact that the lawyer represents a party with a claim against the employee's employer";
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munications with former employees often engenders debate as to
the applicability (or lack thereof) of Model Rule 4.2 or Disciplinary
Rule 7-104(A)(1).' 63 Model Rule 4.2 provides: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the rep-
resentation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by an-
other lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.""
The oft-stated justifications for a rule prohibiting opposing
counsel's ex parte contacts with a represented party include preserv-
ing the integrity of the party's relationship with her own legal coun-
sel, preventing opposing counsel from taking unfair advantage of a
represented party by obtaining or even coercing admissions during
the ex parte contact, and generally promoting ethical behavior by
attorneys.' 65 But like the attorney-client privilege, the prohibition
of ex parte contacts also has been criticized as protecting the inter-
ests of the attorneys rather than those of the clients.' 66 One of the
more undesirable effects of the rule "is to inhibit the acquisition of
moreover, current employees who possess "the authority to bind the corporation" are
considered parties rather than nonparties. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 31, at 163 (cit-
ing District of Columbia Rule 4.2). New Mexico allows communication between oppos-
ing counsel and current employees of an adversary "[e]xcept for persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization." Id. (citing New Mexico Rule
4.2). The Discussion accompanying Rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct expressly limits the rule's prohibition of ex parte contacts "to persons em-
ployed at the time of the communication," thus eliminating the former employee prob-
lem. Id. at 532-33; see also Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. California, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493,
499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
163. See generally Jerome N. Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corpo-
rate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest,
82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1274 (1988) (discussing the extent of the rules' applicability in a
corporate context). For a thoughtful discussion of the potential impact of DR 7-
104(A)(1) on the corporate attorney's moral and ethical obligations to current (and ar-
guably former) employees of his corporate client, see Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pil-
lars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 348-55 (1988).
164. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 4.2. Rule 4.2 is substantially identical to its
ABA predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), which is still effective in some jurisdic-
tions. Seesupra note 161. For the text of DR 7-104(A)(1), see supra note 148. DR 7-104,
in turn, finds its roots in Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics promulgated by
the ABA in 1908, which provided in relevant part:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negoti-
ate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 9 (1908).
165. See Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 87 (D.N.J. 1991); Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (PSE&G) v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745 F. Supp.
1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990). See generally Krulewitch, supra note 163.
166. See John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto
and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 686-93 (1979).
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information about one's case."'' 67
Application of the literal language of Model Rule 4.2 or Disci-
plinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) to the former employee situation at first
appears to generate a bright line test. If the former employee is a
named party represented by counsel, then ex parte communications
are prohibited; if the former employee does not have such status, ex
parte communications are allowed. The apparent straightforward
nature of Model Rule 4.2, however, belies the complexity of its ap-
plication to a corporate party. This difficulty lies in the nature of the
corporate entity as a fictional creation that can only act and speak
through "natural persons."' t68 Courts repeatedly face the specific
question of whether former employees, although not technically
"parties" to the litigation, come within the class of persons that
Model Rule 4.2 was enacted to protect. Answering this question is
made more difficult by the fact that courts are not in accord regard-
ing even which current employees fit within Model Rule 4.2. 69 The
Comment accompanying Model Rule 4.2170 suggests an expansive
application in the corporate context:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits com-
munication by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter
in representation with persons having the managerial re-
sponsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other
person, whose act or omission in connection with that mat-
ter may be imputed to the organization for the purpose of
civil or criminal liability, or whose statement may constitute
167. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991);
see also Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D. Utah 1990) ("To
[the] extent the ethical rule frustrates the search for the truth by preventing an opposing
party from obtaining reasonable access to admissible evidence, it does not assist in the
fair and accurate resolution of disputes." (footnote omitted)).
168. PSE&G, 745 F. Supp. at 1039.
169. The debate often focuses upon whether Model Rule 4.2 limits ex parte contacts
only with those current employees within the "control group," or whether a more ex-
pansive definition is required. Compare Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 314 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) (stating that the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision compels rejection of the
control group test for determination of employees with whom ex parte contacts are pro-
hibited in favor of a much broader class of protected individuals) with Bobele v. Superior
Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (adhering to control group defini-
tion for purposes of determining propriety of ex parte contacts). For a comprehensive
discussion of the conflicting authority on this issue, see Suggs v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1842 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
170. While "[t]he Rules are ... obligatory and disciplinary," the "Comments do not
add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the
Rules." MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Scope of the Rules; see also Boug, 132 F.R.D. at
564 (stating that "the comments may be helpful to a proper resolution of a specific
issue," but do not provide "a binding construction" of the rules).
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an admission on the part of the organization. t7 '
Unfortunately, the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 does not re-
move all uncertainty surrounding the rule's application to communi-
cations with an opposing party's former employees.172 On one
hand, the Comment's inclusion of managerial personnel and per-
sons whose statements may bind an organization-sometimes re-
ferred to as the "managing-speaking agent test" 173 -seems to
suggest that only those in the "control group" are within the pro-
tected class of Model Rule 4.2; former employees would rarely, if
ever, be so categorized. 74 On the other hand, the Comment's iden-
tification of persons whose acts or omissions may result in corporate
liability casts a much wider net, because the activities of even lower-
echelon employees can impugn the corporation pursuant to theo-
ries such as respondeat superior. 75 Moreover, further definition of
the category of persons "whose statement may constitute an admis-
sion on the part of the organization" necessitates cross reference to
the rules of evidence governing admissions.' 76 And while the ABA
171. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 10, Rule 4.2 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
172. In fact, the application of Model Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104(A)(1) to current employ-
ees of a corporate party continues to generate controversy. Some courts read the rule as
prohibiting all ex parte contact with current employees; others interpret it as prohibiting
contact only with members of the corporation's "control group." See Niesig, 558 N.E.2d
at 1035; Bougi, 132 F.R.D. at 571; Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567
(Wash. 1984). See generally Louis A. Stahl, Ex Parte Interviews with Enterprise Employees: A
Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181 (1987) (discussing contemporary
definitions of "party" and application of the rule); Leubsdorf, supra note 166 (discussing
application of the rule to protect lawyers' and clients' interests).
173. See Wright, 691 P.2d at 569; Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 252-53
(D. Kan. 1988).
174. See, e.g., Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that prohibition against ex parte contact with a party represented by counsel
does not extend to former corporate employees who were not and are not members of
the control group).
175. In fact, one of Upjohn's reasons for rejecting the "control group" test as it ap-
plied to the attorney-client privilege was that "[middle-level-and indeed lower-level-
employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corpora-
tion in serious legal difficulties." 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
176. The primary rule of evidence drawn into the Model Rule 4.2 fray is Rule
801 (d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows into evidence testimony, other-
wise excludable as hearsay, because it constitutes an "admission" by a party-opponent.
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that such evidence is not excluded if it
is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement in either an indi-
vidual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of the agency or employment, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
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Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
recently issued a formal opinion, which concludes that Model Rule
4.2 should not be construed as an absolute bar to ex parte contact
by an attorney and unrepresented former employees of an opposing
party,' 77 the opinion is not binding on the judiciary. 78
D. Conflicting Interpretations of Model Rule 4.2
Two decisions in the same court, issued just a few months
apart, reflect opposing perspectives on whether Model Rule 4.2 pro-
hibits contact by opposing counsel of a corporate party's former em-
ployees: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (PSE&G) v. Associated Electric
& Gas Insurance Services Ltd. ,79 and Curley v. Cumberland Farms.'8 '
In PSE&G, the utility sought declaratory relief and monetary
damages from several of its excess liability insurance carriers for
property damage claims relating to alleged environmental contami-
nation at sites owned or used by the utility.' One of the defendant
insurers hired a private investigator to locate and interview the util-
ity's former employees. The utility's objection to this informal dis-
covery method required the magistrate to determine whether such
ex parte contact by an agent of opposing counsel was appropri-
ate.' 82 In an order the trial court later characterized as an attempt
"to strike a Solomonic balance between two extremes,''183 the mag-
istrate allowed the contact, but with severe restrictions. First, the
insurance carrier was required to disclose to the utility the names of
any former employees its investigator planned to interview at least
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Most courts have found it implausible that an ex-employee
could make a statement that would be binding on a former employer under any scenario
imagined by Rule 801(d)(2). See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. BASF Corp., 134 F.R.D. 118,
121 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont.
1986); Wright, 691 P.2d at 569.
177. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
The opinion readily acknowledges that "[n]either the Rule nor its comment purports to
deal with former employees of a corporate party." Id. It further concedes that because a
corporation "necessarily acts through others .... the concerns reflected in the Comment
to Rule 4.2 may survive the termination of the employment relationship." Id.
178. Although opinions issued by the ABA and state ethics committees do not consti-
tute binding precedent, the courts often find the reasoning of such opinions compelling.
See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 463 n.20 (1978); Kessenich v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 684 F.2d 88, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 190-91 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
179. 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.NJ. 1990) (Politan, J.).
180. 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991) (Brotman, J.).
181. 745 F. Supp. at 1038.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 1039.
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two days before he contacted the individual; 8 4 second, any former
employee with whom the utility had already spoken could not be
contacted by the insurance carrier; i8 5 and finally, the insurance car-
rier was required to provide a "warning letter" to former employees
that described the nature of the lawsuit, outlined the purpose of the
interview as marshalling facts regarding the utility's actions at the
sites in question, and informed former employees that the decision
to participate in the interview was theirs alone.'8 6 Further, the court
required the letter to indicate that the utility would provide legal
counsel upon request.'8 7
Believing the order too restrictive, the insurance carrier asked
the district court to reverse the magistrate's order. Joined in its
cause by another major insurance carrier, which participated as ami-
cus curiae, ls s the defendant urged that Rule 4.2 had no application
to ex parte contacts with a party's former employees in general, that
it had no application to the former employees in the declaratory
judgment at hand in particular because no civil liability could accrue
to the utility based on the employees' statements, and that policy
grounds dictated a "party neutral" interpretation of the ethical
rules.'" 9 The insurance carrier complained that the magistrate's
regulation of contact with former employees provided the utility
with "preferential access" to vital information, and allowed an op-
portunity for the utility's counsel to manipulate the testimony of the
former employees, thus "filtering" the truth.'9 0 The district court
agreed with the insurance carrier's argument that the magistrate's
order was in error, but the court's ruling did not endorse the insur-
ance carrier's desired result of allowing its counsel free reign with
the utility's former employees. To the contrary, the court held that
Model Rule 4.2 prohibited any informal contacts between the insur-
ance carrier's counsel and the utility's former employees. 1 '
184. Id. at 1038.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id. The amicus curiae brief submitted by The Travelers Indemnity Company
was largely based on affidavits submitted by Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the
ABA Special Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards ("Kutak Commis-
sion"), and New York University Professor Stephen Gillers, a recognized authority in
legal ethics. See id. at 1041. The court did not embrace the arguments offered by the
professors that former employees, or at least those who were not in management, do not
fall within the scope of Model Rule 4.2. See id. at 1041-42.
189. See id. at 1038-39.
190. See id. at 1039.
191. See id.
1992]
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In support of its absolutist position, the PSE&G court focused
upon the language of the Comment to Model Rule 4.2, which pro-
hibits contact "with any other person whose act or omission in con-
nection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability."'192 Stressing the importance
of the word "may" in the Comment, the court opined that the "dis-
positive inquiry" is "whether... a former employee's acts or omis-
sions could be imputed, under any factual scenario, to the
organization."
93
In holding that a former employee's acts or omissions could be
imputed to the former employer, the court first rejected the insur-
ance carrier's argument for declaratory judgment that no "liability"
could be imputed to the utility.'94 Rather, a finding that the insur-
ance coverage did not include environmental contamination would
result in the utility being held liable for the entire cost of remedia-
tion. 195 The court then noted that testimony by an employee that
he personally dumped toxic wastes into the ground could impute
liability to the utility. 19 6 The court continued:
The principle that must be emphasized is that the
harm caused by the imputable act is the same whether the
witness is a present or former employee. The change in
employment status does not effect [sic] the nature of his or
her actions vis-a-vis whether they are imputable to the em-
ployer. The impact of the acts and factual testimony re-
mains the same. The Rule, as described in the Comment,
... protects the organizations [sic] interests in the acts and
omissions. Therefore, both the present and former em-
ployee should be a party considered represented by the
corporate attorney. As such, each individual can not be the
subject of informal ex parte investigative fact finding.' 97
The PSE&G court further deemed "unworkable" a requirement
either that an organization show that an individual's acts or omis-
sions may impute liability to the organization before Model Rule 4.2
192. Id. at 1039-42.
193. Id. at 1040.
194. See id. at 1039.
195. Id. The court defined a declaratory judgment as "a binding adjudication on the
rights and liabilities of the parties," and observed that "the prevailing party in this action
will be straddled with the enormous liability of funding the cleanup of the various pol-
luted sites at issue." Id.
196. See id. at 1042.
197. Id.
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applies,' 98 or that a decision to permit ex parte contact be condi-
tioned on the understanding that counsel will cease questioning "if
it appears that imputable information is being divulged."' 99 In ad-
dition to the "benefit of simplicity," the court reasoned that applica-
tion of Model Rule 4.2 to former employees furthered the rule's
policy goals by protecting both the former employee from "over-
reaching" by the investigative party and the former employer by
limiting the potential for imputed liability. 200 Finally, the court did
not find compelling the arguments regarding the increased costs at-
tendant to formal discovery of a party's former employees, stating
that "prompt use of the deposition process will ultimately produce
less procedural haggling and thus may be, in the long run, more
cost efficient."-2
0 1
Just four months later, a judge sitting in the same federal dis-
trict court found the PSE&G court's rationale unpersuasive. In
Curley v. Cumberland Farms,2 °2 former convenience store employees
pursued a class action asserting that their former employer engaged
in a pattern of extortion by using the company's Loss Prevention
Specialists ("Specialists") to coerce false confessions from employ-
ees to cover store losses. 2 3 The former employees sought discov-
ery of the names and addresses of Cumberland Farms's current and
former Specialists, and agreed not to attempt to contact (1) Special-
ists currently employed by Cumberland Farms and (2) former Spe-
cialists with whom the former employees had actual contact during
their periods of employment. Cumberland Farms moved for a pro-
tective order prohibiting the former employees' counsel from com-
municating ex parte even with the former Specialists who had not
had previous contact with the former employees.20 4 The magistrate
denied Cumberland Farms's motion, holding that the former em-
ployees in question were not within the scope of Model Rule 4.2.205
Cumberland Farms appealed the magistrate's ruling, which was sub-
sequently affirmed by the district court.2 0
Like the PSE&G court, the Curley court focused upon language
in the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 suggesting that the rule bars ex
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 1043.
202. 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991).
203. See id. at 79.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 83.
19921 283
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parte contact with any person whose act or omission could impute
civil or criminal liability to the party.20 7 The court acknowledged a
possible scenario where a former Specialist revealed to the plaintiffs'
counsel that he had, at management's direction, extorted confes-
sions from individuals he believed to be innocent; such a concession
would result in an imputation of liability to Cumberland Farms. 208
But the persuasiveness of this argument pales, the court noted,
"when one recalls that this purported imputation of liability is en-
tirely hypothetical" because it is equally possible that the former
Specialists "have no relevant information concerning the dispute in
this case, or that they possess information which bolsters defend-
ant's case."' 20 9  Having classified the imputation of liability as
"wholly hypothetical," the Curley court affirmed the magistrate's
holding that Cumberland Farms had not met its burden of provid-
ing sufficient facts to compel the conclusion that the former employ-
ees at issue came within the parameters of Model Rule 4.2.2 0
Further assessing the impact that its decision might have on the
policy underlying Model Rule 4.2, the Curley court noted that its rul-
ing caused no harm to the goal of preserving the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship, which it viewed as the raison d'&re of
Rule 4.2.2 l ' Moreover, the court expressed confidence that the
"guidelines" set by the magistrate for the ex parte contacts, which
included keeping a detailed log of the contacts and making available
to defense counsel memoranda and witnesses' statements stemming
from the interviews, would substantially curtail, if not eliminate, the
potential for unethical conduct during the interviews.2 12 The court
offered "one final and very practical reason ' 2 1 3 for its holding:
To disallow ex parte contacts with all former employees
207. See id. at 81.
208. See id.
209. Id. The court also noted that liability for racketeering "cannot be imposed on a
corporation merely by imputing the predicate acts of low-level corporate employees
upon the corporation under a respondeat superior theory," and that even the plaintiffs'
common-law claims of criminal or malicious conduct cannot be imputed to a defendant
absent a showing that "the conduct was directed or ratified by defendants." Id.
210. See id. at 82.
211. See id.
212. Id.; see also id. at 94-95 (setting forth the magistrate's guidelines for the ex parte
interviews). Certain conditions imposed by the magistrate and approved by the district
court, specifically the providing of plaintiffs' counsel's interview notes and witness state-
ments to defense counsel, were initially suggested by plaintiffs' counsel and offered pur-
suant to an express waiver of the work product protection that would normally shield
such materials from discovery. See id. at 94; see also infra Part IV.
213. 134 F.R.D. at 82.
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pursuant to [Model Rule] 4.2 based on a hypothetical pos-
sibility that such employees could impute liability on a
party corporation would cause the already substantial costs
of litigation to skyrocket and would result in an enormous
expenditure of time not mandated by the ethical rule con-
tained in [Model Rule] 4.2. It must be recalled that [Model
Rule] 4.2 is designed to protect the attorney-client rela-
tionship, not to control the flow of information relevant to
a lawsuit. The court cannot permit ethical rules to be used
by a party to chill the flow of potentially harmful informa-
tion to opposing counsel where the danger of an ethical
violation is minute. To preclude the informal contacts
sought by plaintiffs in this action would be overly
burdensome.214
The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility attempted to resolve the applicability of Model Rule 4.2
and Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) to former employees,2 15 but it did
so without providing any new insight into the competing interests at
stake. In Formal Opinion 359, issued in March 1991, the Commit-
tee recounted the split of authority on the matter, including the
PSE&G decision, and held:
While the Committee recognizes that persuasive policy ar-
guments can be and have been made for extending the am-
bit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some former corporate
employees, the fact remains that the text of the Rule does
not do so and the comment gives no basis for concluding
that such coverage was intended. Especially where, as
here, the effect of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of
information about one's case, the Committee is loath,
given the text of Model Rule 4.2 and its Comment, to ex-
pand its coverage to former employees by means of liberal
interpretation.
Accordingly, . . . a lawyer representing a client in a
matter adverse to a corporate party that is represented by
another lawyer may, without violating Model Rule 4.2,
communicate about the subject of the representation with
an unrepresented former employee of the corporate party
without the consent of the corporation's lawyer.21 6
At least eight state bar associations have reached a similar result.2 1i
214. Id. at 82-83.
215. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
216. Id. at 4.
217. These states are Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
19921 285
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E. Reconciling Competing Interests
Analysis of the interests competing for dominance in the deter-
mination of the propriety of ex parte contact between counsel and
an opposing party's former employees pits philosophical against
practical considerations.21 8 On the philosophical side, the protec-
tion of the legal system's integrity is emphasized in the claim that ex
parte contact allows excessive opportunity for manipulation of testi-
mony by sophisticated counsel and results in a distortion of the rele-
vant facts. On the practical side, the extraordinary costs associated
with requiring formal discovery of ex-employees make meaningful
discovery and case preparation prohibitive in many cases, especially
because no alternative mechanism exists for preliminarily assessing
whether an ex-employee possesses sufficient knowledge of the mat-
ter in dispute to make a deposition feasible.219
Although the choice is a difficult one, the better rule is a bright
line test that permits ex parte access to former employees. The sup-
port for such a rule, however, is hardly limited to practical consider-
ations. Perhaps the most persuasive reasons for allowing ex parte
contact of an opposing party's former employees is that neither
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 345
n.4 (D. Conn. 1991).
218. One court identified 12 separate interests affected when the propriety of ex parte
interviews is debated. See Boug& v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D.
Utah 1990).
219. The efficiency of ex parte interviews to determine whom to depose becomes crit-
ical in cases such as Curley v. Cumberland Farms, 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991), where
the plaintiff had identified over 80 former employees who might possess information
relevant to the lawsuit. See supra notes 202-214 and accompanying text. Even if the
plaintiff prevailed and the relevant procedural rules allowed for assessing the cost of the
depositions against the former employer, the inefficiency would merely be shifted from
one party to the other rather than eliminated. With or without the potential for reim-
bursement upon prevailing, the cost of conducting numerous depositions may be pro-
hibitive to a party of modest resources, thereby preventing the thorough factfinding
necessary to adjudicate a dispute fairly. See Bougi, 132 F.R.D. at 562 (If a party is limited
to "depositions or other formal discovery," then "[tihe cost ... may be prohibitive and
contrary to efforts to reduce the costs which the burden of formal discovery places on
litigants, counsel and the courts." (citing Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial
Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17 (1988))); Bobele v. Superior Court, 245
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the trial court's ruling requiring
plaintiffs to limit contact with defendant's former employees to formal discovery chan-
nels "has made this litigation so costly for plaintiffs that they cannot pursue their case").
The costs associated with the screening interviews can be further decreased by delegat-
ing the task to paralegals. See, e.g., Bougi, 132 F.R.D. at 563 (finding nothing "overreach-
ing or inherently abusive" in a process where a paralegal conducted initial screening
interviews of corporate party's nonmanagerial employees and then sent letters to em-
ployees asking the employees to advise counsel if the letter "misstates the
conversation").
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Model Rule 4.2 nor its Comment truly applies to the former em-
ployee situation.220 A former employee is not a represented party
or managerial member of an organization; furthermore, the termi-
nation of an individual's employment relationship with a party ne-
gates the possibility that the individual's statement could constitute
a binding admission.221 The question that troubled the PSE&G
court-whether a former employee's acts or omissions may impute
liability to the former employer2 222is admittedly a closer call.
However, the court's reasoning in PSE&G is fundamentally flawed.
The court found that because an ex parte contact may reveal testi-
mony regarding acts or omissions of the former employee that oc-
curred during his period of employment, and because such acts or
omissions might reflect culpability on the part of the employer,223
such an "individual can not be the subject of informal ex parte in-
vestigative fact finding. ' 224 Thus, the court incorrectly focused on
the potential ramifications of the individual's knowledge as the de-
termining factor, rather than on whether the former employee con-
stituted a "party" with whom ex parte interviews are inappropriate
under Model Rule 4.2.25 Perhaps inadvertently, the court applied
Model Rule 4.2 to protect certain facts from disclosure, which in any
event would have been fully discoverable with the use of a formal
220. As explained by Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., the Reporter for the ABA Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards at the time the Model Rules were
drafted:
This regime does not address communications withformer agents and employ-
ees, and technically there should be no bar, since former employees cannot
bind the organization, and their statements cannot be introduced as admissions
of the organization. Speaking with a former employee therefore does not do
damage to the policy underlying Rule 4.2-undercutting or 'end running' an
on-going lawyer-client relationship.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 436 (1988 Supp.) (citation omitted).
221. See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984) (reasoning
that because former employees "cannot possibly speak for the corporation," DR 7-
104(A)(1) does not prohibit ex parte contact with them).
222. 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (D.NJ. 1990).
223. Id. (stating that employee could reveal to opposing counsel "that over a period
of years he personally dumped toxic waste into the ground," and reasoning that because
this fact could impute liability to the former employer for costs of environmental
remediation of the site, Rule 4.2 prohibited ex parte contact with the former employee).
224. Id.
225. The same flaw permeated the court's holding concerning ex parte contacts with
current employees in Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988), where
the court prohibited "ex parte interviews by plaintiff's counsel of any ... of the named
employees who may have been involved in [the conduct] at issue in any way that their
actions as agents may be imputed to defendant corporation for purposes of civil liabil-
ity." Id. at 253.
2871992]
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discovery device such as a deposition.226 Because it is impossible to
discern which former employees possess relevant (and potentially
damaging) facts until an informal interview is conducted, the
PSE&G court places the cart before the horse.22 7
In addition to respecting the literal language of Model Rule 4.2,
permitting ex parte contact with former employees has the addi-
tional benefit of not contradicting the rationale that inspired the
rule's enactment. Certainly the rule's historical and oft-stated pur-
pose of preserving the integrity of the attorney-client relationship 228
cannot be defeated where the former employee is not even repre-
sented by legal counsel.2 2 9 Moreover, a contrary interpretation of
the ethical rules to prevent one party from contacting nonparties
who may possess relevant data essentially creates a new "privilege."
Such a privilege has no place in a system striving to construe nar-
rowly existing privileges that serve to frustrate the factfinding
process.23 o
226. Carried to its logical conclusion, PSE&G would prohibit ex parte contacts with
any eyewitness to any event that resulted in litigation, because the eyewitness would
provide the factual basis for assessing liability against a party. See also Oak Indus. v.
Zenith Indus., No. 86-C-4302, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1988) ("The fact that
former employees may have information damaging to the employer has nothing to do
with the question of whether the employee should be considered an alter ego of the
employer."); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass.
1987) (holding that "[tihe mere fact that [the former employee] may be a prospective
witness, even a critical one, does not trigger the prohibitions of DR 7-104(A)(1)").
227. The difficulty of shielding all former employees who possess facts adverse to the
former employer is demonstrated in a case involving current employees, Chancellor v.
Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988). In that case, where plaintiff alleged
wrongful denials of promotions, the court prohibited plaintiffs counsel from conducting
ex parte interviews of any employees "who may have been involved in the denial of
promotions at issue in any way that their actions as agents may be imputed to defendant
corporation for purposes of civil liability." Id. at 253. The court readily admitted that it
was "without sufficient facts" to determine which individuals fell within that category,
and left resolution of the matter to plaintiffs counsel. See id. at 253-54. This ruling left
little resolved because the very purpose of the interviews that plaintiffs counsel wished
to conduct was the determination of which employees possessed relevant facts.
228. See, e.g., University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1990); Frey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 34 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (addressing text of DR 7-104(A)(1)); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d
564, 567 (Wash. 1984) (also addressing DR 7-104(A)(1) and its predecessor Canon 9).
229. See Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding that ex-employee has no attorney-client relationship with corporate coun-
sel that would be "jeopardized" by ex parte communication).
230. In Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560 (D. Utah 1990), the
court opined that such a privilege should not be recognized even with regard to commu-
nications with current low-level employees of a corporate party, reasoning that "[i]f the
employee has information adverse to corporate policy or practice which is at issue in any
litigation, the employee must be free to speak and the courts should have access to the
evidence." Id. at 566.
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Certainly, the broader concerns regarding potential manipula-
tion of a witness during an ex parte interview should not be lightly
dismissed. Existing practical, ethical, and legal mechanisms, how-
ever, serve to deter such conduct. On a practical level, the corpo-
rate attorney will no doubt have "the earliest and best opportunity"
to identify former employees who may possess relevant informa-
tion.23' Provided that the corporate attorney does not improperly
solicit representation of the former employee or overstep the
bounds of other ethical rules,232 there is no prohibition against the
attorney promptly contacting the former employees "to elicit infor-
mation... and to counsel and prepare them' 23 3 for interviews with
opposing counsel. When the anticipated interviews do occur,
Model Rule 4.3 and its Comment place an affirmative duty on op-
posing counsel to ascertain that the unrepresented party fully un-
derstands both the lawyer's role in the matter and the lawyer's
bias.234 The attorney also may not inquire into areas where disclo-
sure would violate the attorney-client privilege 23 5 or the work prod-
23623uct doctrine, or would divulge trade secrets.23 7  Further, if
231. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (N.Y. 1990).
232. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 4.3 (addressing attorney dealings with
unrepresented individuals).
233. See Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1034.
234. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reason-
able efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 4.3. The comment accompanying Model Rule 4.3
states:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with
legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a
disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client.
During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not
give advice to an unrepresented person other than advice to obtain counsel.
Id., Rule 4.3 cmt.
235. Even when a former employee is currently unrepresented by counsel, certain
communications between the employee and corporate counsel, including those that oc-
curred prior to termination of employment, remain privileged. See PPG Indus., Inc. v.
BASF Corp., 134 F.R.D. 118, 123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (requiring opposing counsel to
advise former employee that he may not disclose prior communications between himself
and corporate counsel); Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. California, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493,
499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (attorney-client privilege shields "all confidential communica-
tions encompassed therein"); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 220, at 436-436.1 (recogniz-
ing situations where a former employee may be privy to information shielded from
discovery by the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege).
236. See infra Part IV.
237. See supra note 145.
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specific circumstances indicate abuse of informal discovery, court in-
tervention can provide structure and control over the interviewing
process.238 Parties are also free to enter into their own agreement
outlining not only the terms and conditions of ex parte contacts, but
also limiting the uses of witness statements and information gath-
ered during the interviews.2 39 Finally, if the former employee does
possess knowledge that makes his deposition or trial testimony or
both necessary, any bias resulting from improper coaching by coun-
sel during ex parte interviews can be fully explored by opposing
counsel during cross examination.240
238. Based on his more than four decades of legal experience, United States District
Judge Jack Weinstein concluded that "almost all discovery abuse can be controlled or
prevented" by "attentive and firm management by a judge or magistrate." Jack B.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice
Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1915 (1989). Otherjudges obviously agree. See,
e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms, 134 F.R.D. 77, 82, 94-95 (D.N.J. 1991) (adopting
procedure established by magistrate requiring counsel to keep log of contacts with op-
posing party's former employees and to share interview notes with opposing counsel);
Boug6 v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 564 (D. Utah 1990) (noting that
court's power to control ex parte interviews is not limited by Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather that it is within court's inherent authority to control
litigation practices); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988)
(asserting court's inherent authority); Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129
F.R.D. 621, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that where "a strong likelihood" exists that a
former employee possesses privileged information, "an appropriately tailored order can
be issued" to prevent disclosure); Amarin Plastics, Inc., v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116
F.R.D. 36, 39 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that court has "inherent" authority "to issue
appropriate orders to prohibit or remedy litigation practices which raise ethical con-
cerns," including the use of informal interviews not expressly mentioned in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery); accord Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 420 (es-
tablishing guidelines for plaintiff's counsel to conduct ex parte interviews of defendant's
current employees).
239. After counsel have negotiated an agreement governing the terms and conditions
of discovery and subsequent use of the discovered information, the parties may submit
to the trial court, pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a stipu-
lated protective order that incorporates their agreement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). If the
court approves the order, a party who violates the agreement may be held in contempt
of court and subjected to a number of sanctions, including the entry of an order prohib-
iting the offending party from supporting or defending against certain claims or de-
fenses and from introducing certain matters into evidence. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
240. See, e.g., FED. R. EvIo. 611 (b) (stating that "matters affecting the credibility of the
witness" are within the proper scope of cross examination); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c)
(providing that Federal Rules of Evidence govern examination and cross examination of
witnesses during depositions).
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IV. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND INFORMAL DISCOVERY OF
A PARTY'S FORMER EMPLOYEES
A. An Overview of the Work Product Doctrine
While communications covered by the attorney-client privilege
are virtually impenetrable, 24 1 the work product doctrine offers a
more limited but nonetheless effective mechanism for shielding cer-
tain aspects of the exchange of information between a corporate
party's former employees and counsel for either party.242 Born of
the wrongful death case of Hickman v. Taylor,2 4 3 the doctrine is cur-
rently codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.244
241. As a general rule, the protection afforded to communications by the attorney-
client privilege is absolute. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981)
(holding that "considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the
attorney-client privilege"); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court, 881 F.2d
1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize an "unavailability exception" to obtain
material otherwise covered by attorney-client privilege). Very narrow exceptions do ex-
ist, allowing for discovery of attorney-client privileged materials in shareholder deriva-
tive suits where claims of corporate mismanagement are alleged, see Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), in situa-
tions where the attorney's advice is solicited for the purpose of committing "crime,
fraud or other misconduct," see In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
and in cases where the attorney's own conduct is at issue, as in legal malpractice litiga-
tion and collection actions brought by attorneys against their clients, see Dodd v. Wil-
liams, 560 F. Supp. 372, 377 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1983). For a discussion of these limited
exceptions, see generally EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 82-98.
242. "The work-product rule is not a privilege but a qualified immunity .... [W]ork-
product materials may... be ordered produced upon an adverse party's demonstration
of substantial need or ability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship." Admiral
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d at 1494 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401). For an excellent overview of
the doctrine, see Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71
GEO. L.J. 917 (1983).
243. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Hickman litigation arose from the sinking of a tugboat.
Relatives of a deceased crew member sought materials, including written reports taken
from survivors and witnesses, detailed notes from oral statements, and any related
"records, reports, statements or other memoranda." Id. at 498-99. The district court
rejected the defendant's claim of privilege, see Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 482
(E.D. Pa. 1945) (en banc), and when the defendant refused to release the material, both
he and his attorney were found in criminal contempt. See Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d
212 (3d Cir. 1945) (en banc). The Third Circuit's reversal of the contempt holding was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, which concluded that ordering the release of the materi-
als "contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of
legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted
inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney." 329 U.S. at 510.
244. This Rule provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable under ... this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (in-
cluding the other party's attorney . . . ) only upon a showing that the party
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The boundaries of the work product doctrine are apparent on
the face of the Rule: it prohibits discovery of (a) tangible documents
and materials (b) that are prepared for or in anticipation of litigation
(c) by or for a party or that party's representative (d) that reflect the
legal theories and thought processes of legal counsel. When these
criteria are met, the discovery of certain types of work product may
still be compelled, but only where the party seeking discovery dem-
onstrates a "substantial need" for the materials to prepare his case
for trial and satisfies the court that equivalent materials cannot be
obtained elsewhere without "undue hardship" on the party seeking
them.245 Moreover, the rule mandates heightened protection of
"opinion work product, ' 246 that is, any material that reveals "the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney."'
24 7
The rationale for according special treatment to materials that
incorporate and reflect the attorney's view of a case, first articulated
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the
party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery
of such materials .... the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Although most frequently asserted in civil matters, the work
product doctrine has been characterized as playing an "even more vital" role "in assur-
ing the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 238 (1975); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (criminal procedure work product
doctrine).
245. For a comprehensive explanation of the nuances associated with the work prod-
uct doctrine, see EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 99-164.
246. See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the Third Circuit
distinguished opinion work product: "Opinion work product includes such items as an
attorney's legal strategy, his intended lines of proof, his evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of his case, and the inferences he draws from interviews of witnesses."
247. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Work product discovery limitations set forth in Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to conflicting interpretations when
attorneys' notes and memoranda from witness interviews are at issue. Some courts hold
that Rule 26 absolutely bars discovery of this category of opinion work product. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976); FDIC v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 596, 600 (M.D. Fla. 1990). Those courts declining to
adopt an absolute rule nonetheless recognize that such work product is deserving of
special protection. See, e.g., In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981) (permitting
discovery of opinion work product only in extraordinary circumstances, such as those
involving fraud); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[O]pinion work
product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and
extraordinary circumstances."); Connolly Data Sys. v. Victor Technologies, Inc., 114
F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1989) ("[T]he materials containing the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions and legal theories of an attorney are discoverable only in rare and
extraordinary circumstances."). In Upjohn, the Supreme Court recognized these diver-
gent views but did not resolve the issue. See 449 U.S. at 401,
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in Hickman and more recently affirmed in Upjohn, is the essential
need "that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy. "248 In the
Court's view, allowing discovery of such material would discourage
attorneys from collecting their thoughts on paper. 249 Hickman ex-
pressed additional public policy concerns:
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal sys-
tem would be demoralizing. And the interests of the cli-
ents and the course of justice would be poorly served.25 °
B. Relevance of the Work Product Doctrine to Informal Discovery of
Former Employees
The work product doctrine is relevant to informal discovery of
former employees in at least four major respects. The traditional
application of the doctrine shields from discovery notes and memo-
randa related to the interview prepared by the attorney; it also pro-
tects signed witness statements obtained during or after the
interview. A third application of the doctrine, more contemporary
and controversial than the first two, prevents opposing counsel from
discovering the identity of documents selected by counsel and dis-
cussed during the interview. Finally, the work product doctrine may
bar discovery of the substance of the questions asked by counsel
during the interview.25" ' Each application is discussed below.
248. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (quoted with approval in Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-98).
249. Id. (quoted with approval in Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398).
250. Id. In his concurring opinion,Justice Jackson synopsized the doctrine's rationale
in eloquent but simple terms: "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned pro-
fession to perform its functions ... on wits borrowed from the adversary." Id. at 516
(Jackson, J., concurring).
251. The work product doctrine also has been successfully cited as grounds for refusal
to furnish the names and addresses of witnesses interviewed as part of the litigation
preparation process. Compare Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467
(11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that the names and addresses of witnesses interviewed by the
plaintiff are subject to discovery) with Board of Educ. v. Admiral Heating & Ventilating,
104 F.R.D. 23, 32 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (noting that interview lists contain no "substantive
relevant facts" and denying discovery because to do so would afford plaintiffs "the po-
tential for significant insights into the defense lawyers' preparation of their case"). See
also Massachusetts v. First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 149 (D. Mass. 1986)
(discussing authority on both sides of the issue and concluding that while discovery of
names and addresses of "persons with knowledge" was permissible, list of witnesses
interviewed by defense counsel was protected by work product doctrine).
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1. Notes and Memoranda Prepared During and After Interviews.-
The work product doctrine, long embraced by both federal and
state courts, 25 2 does not provide attorney's notes and memoranda
absolute immunity from discovery, but does place rigorous obsta-
cles in the path of counsel seeking such work product. Courts have
interpreted the doctrine, both prior and subsequent to its codifica-
tion as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, as establishing a strong
presumption against discovery of notes and memoranda that con-
tain oral statements made by a witness during an interview con-
ducted by a lawyer.253 Such a presumption exists because notes
containing a witness's answers necessarily reveal the questions that
the attorney thought relevant.254 The questions, in turn, sketch a
road map of counsel's mental processes regarding his or her theory
of the case.255 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman
suggested that opposing counsel might never be able to make a
showing of necessity sufficient to justify production of attorney
memoranda that contain "oral statements made by witnesses. '"256
The Upjohn Court was hesitant to adopt the near-absolutist per-
spective implicit in Hickman, but it nonetheless interpreted the work
product doctrine as mandating the highest level of privacy for work
product consisting of an attorney's notes and memoranda from non-
party interviews. 257 The Hickman Court had implied that production
of "relevant and non-privileged facts . . . hidden in an attorney's
file," including those facts recorded in an attorney's interview notes,
is allowed only where "production of those facts is essential to the
preparation of one's case."' 25 8 The Hickman Court's illustration of a
unique situation justifying breach of work product barricades is a
case "where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached
252. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 107 ("Most states have adopted discovery
procedures similar to those applied in the federal courts, and they tend to provide simi-
lar protection for attorney work product.").
253. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (recognizing a "zone of privacy" afforded to an attorney by the work
product doctrine within which to think, plan, weigh facts and evidence, and prepare
strategy);JamesJulian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142-43 (D. Del. 1982) (rec-
ognizing a similar protected area). See generally EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 130-
45.
254. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 400 & n.8.
255. Id. at 399-400 (disclosing notes "tends to reveal the attorney's mental
processes").
256. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
257. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02 ("[A] far stronger showing of necessity and unavaila-
bility by other means . . .would be necessary ....").
258. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
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only with great difficulty."'259 Although it acknowledged the validity
of this "unavailable witness" example,26 ° the Court in Upjohn re-
fused to compel production of attorney memoranda and notes con-
taining witness statements, even where the interviewees were
"scattered across the globe" and where Upjohn had "forbidden its
employees to answer questions it considers irrelevant."' 26 ' While it
did not conclude, as Hickman implied and some lower courts have
held,262 that a showing of necessity could never overcome the doc-
trine's protection of attorney notes and memoranda that recorded
oral statements from witnesses, 263 the Court in Upjohn advised:
To the extent that [such notes] do not reveal [attorney-
client] communications, they reveal the attorneys' mental
processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26
and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be dis-
closed simply on a showing of substantial need and inabil-
ity to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.26
In short, the formidable (if not insurmountable) burden placed
on counsel seeking to unearth an adversary's opinion work product
relegates to a safe harbor the notes and memoranda compiled by
counsel during or after an interview of former employees.265 In
view of the symmetrical application of restrictions and protections
provided by the work product doctrine for counsel on both sides of
the table regarding the notes and memoranda prepared during or
after interviews of nonparties, its application need not and should
not be modified as it relates to informal discovery of a party's for-
mer employees.
2. Signed Witness Statements.-A signed statement from a former
employee that purports to memorialize his recollection of key events
259. Id. Finding no such situation in the case before it, the Court in Hickman denied
opposing counsel access to the defendant's attorney's notes containing oral statements
of survivors or witnesses. See id. at 512-13.
260. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399.
261. Id.
262. See supra note 247.
263. 449 U.S. at 401.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., In re GrandJury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979) (find-
ing that memos prepared in anticipation of litigation by corporation's outside counsel
following interviews with employees constitute protected work product); Smith v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665, 687 (D. Kan. 1989) (observing that notes of corpo-
rate counsel made while interviewing current and former employees are covered by both
work product and attorney-client privilege; thus they are "doubly-non-discoverable");
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142-44 (D. Del. 1982) (applying a
similar rationale).
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as it exists at the time of the informal interview may prove useful in
several respects. First, the statement serves the same record-keep-
ing function as the attorney's own notes regarding the content of
the interview. Later review of the statement, especially when a sig-
nificant number of statements have been obtained, will aid the attor-
ney's determination as to what role, if any, a particular interviewee
will play in advancing either party's theory of the case. Second, if
the individual is willing to execute a sworn statement, the document
can provide support for the factual allegations made in a summary
judgment or other pretrial motion. 26 ' Finally, the written statement
helps a great deal where either party has designated the ex-em-
ployee as a potential trial witness. If the ex-employee recants or
significantly alters his story on the stand, the statement provides
powerful impeachment material. 267 If the ex-employee remains ba-
sically true to his original recitation of the facts but his memory of
certain details has become clouded, the statement can be used to
refresh his recollection prior to or during a deposition or trial.268
Depending on the ultimate use of a former employee's state-
ment, a discussion of the discoverability of the statements may
prove to be much ado about nothing. If the statement is cited to
support a summary judgment motion, for example, opposing coun-
sel must be served with a copy of the statement along with his adver-
sary's brief.269  If the document is used to refresh the former
employee's recollection to testify at deposition or at trial, the ad-
verse party may be entitled to production of the writing pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.270 If opposing counsel curries favor
with the former employees who have been interviewed, the individu-
als may request copies of their statements and voluntarily provide
them to opposing counsel. 2 7 1 The discussion thus narrows to
266. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (allowing submission of affidavits in support of a sum-
mary judgment motion, provided that the affidavits are made on personal knowledge of
the affiant, contain facts which would be admissible in evidence, and contain an aver-
ment of competency to testify). Submission of supporting affidavits is not mandatory,
but if provided by the movant, opposing counsel must submit similar sworn materials
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id.
267. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit examination of a witness regarding a prior
statement without showing the statement to the witness, see FED. R. EVID. 613(a), and
provide that any party may impeach the credibility of a witness, "including the party
calling the witness," FED. R. EvID. 607.
268. See FED. R. EvID. 612.
269. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
270. See FED. R. EvID. 612 (leaving the decision to allow disclosure to the court's dis-
cretion). Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence to depositions. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(c).
271. Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants a nonparty an abso-
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whether counsel can compel disclosure of statements of ex-employ-
ees gathered by opposing counsel prior to, or in lieu of, the occur-
rence of any of the above events.
Witness statements of nonparties traditionally have been cate-
gorized as work product,2 72 subject to discovery only where counsel
has demonstrated "substantial need of the materials" to prepare his
case and has shown that he is "unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means." 273 In light of Hickman and Upjohn, this is a very difficult
standard to satisfy.2 74 Some courts have refused to compel produc-
tion of witness statements until opposing counsel has made an
unsuccessful effort to depose or interview the authors of the state-
ments sought. 2
75
lute right to obtain a copy of any statement "concerning the action or its subject matter
previously made by that person." Until recently, neither federal procedural rules nor
case law restricted the nonparty's conveyance of her statement to opposing counsel. See
DESSEM, supra note 11, at 73; Kathleen Waits, Work Product Protection for Witness Statements:
Time for Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 305, 336 n.153 (citing David J. Blair, A Guide to the
New Federal Discovery Practice, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 58, 63 n.25 (1971) (predicting that the
practical result of the Rule will be that parties "urg[e] friendly witnesses to request their
own statements for delivery to the party")). In 1988, however, one district court held
that allowing a nonparty witness to obtain a copy of a statement originally given at the
request of plaintiffs' counsel, for the purpose of disclosing it to defense counsel, would
violate the spirit and the letter of the work product doctrine. Accordingly, the court
held that the individual was entitled to the statement, but that defense counsel could not
receive a copy or otherwise review its contents until the individual offered deposition or
trial testimony "on the basis of a memory refreshed by his statement or until plaintiffs'
counsel cross-examines any such witness on the basis of his statement." In re Conver-
gent Technologies Second Half 1984 Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 555, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
To the extent that a controversy exists on this point, it is rendered moot by the author's
recommendation at the conclusion of this section that counsel would be required to
produce statements of nonparty ex-employees only if opposing counsel had also at-
tempted to interview the former employees and obtain statements from them.
272. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir.
1970), afd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); D'Amico v. Cox Creek Refining Co., 126 F.R.D. 501,
506 (D. Md. 1989); Convergent Technologies, 122 F.R.D. at 556; Colorado v. Schmidt-
Tiago Constr. Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1985); Thorton v. Continental Grain
Co., 103 F.R.D. 605, 606 (S.D. Il. 1984).
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see D'Amico, 126 F.R.D. at 506. As Professors Wright and
Miller observe, Rule 26(b)(3) "creates no right in a party to the litigation to obtain a
copy of a statement of an ordinary witness without the usual showing required for work
product." 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2028 (1970).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 252-264.
275. See, e.g., Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11 th Cir. 1984);
FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 596, 605 (M.D. Fla. 1990). The argu-
ment that the "substantial need" requirement is met when the passage of time may have
affected the witness's memory is also suspect. See id. at 604. In the related context of
attorneys' interview notes of present and former employees, the Upjohn Court held that
1992]
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Although application of the doctrine to nonparty witness state-
ments remains firmly entrenched, 276 forceful arguments have been
made for abolishing the work product doctrine's protection for non-
party witness statements.277 It is argued, for example, that the costs
of the application of the doctrine to witness statements far exceed
the benefits.278 While one can argue convincingly that statements of
former employees obtained by counsel pursuant to ex parte, infor-
mal interviews should be discoverable relatively early in the discov-
ery process, such discovery should be had only under limited
conditions. Specifically, the statements should not be ordered or
permitted to be disclosed unless opposing counsel has indepen-
dently conducted interviews or scheduled depositions of the ex-em-
ployees.279 If the informal interview route is taken, and the
interviewees are agreeable, counsel would be required to obtain
statements himself. After counsel for both sides have conducted in-
terviews and obtained, or at least attempted to obtain, statements
from the ex-employees, an exchange of the statements is appropri-
ate pursuant to mutual requests for production of such docu-
ments. 280 If counsel chooses to depose rather than interview the
former employees who have provided statements to his adversary,
the existing statements should be produced shortly before the depo-
sition is commenced.2 8'
neither substantial need nor undue hardship was sufficiently established even though
the party seeking discovery would have had to traverse the globe to replicate the inter-
views. 449 U.S. at 399-401.
276. See Henderson v. Zurn Indus., 131 F.R.D. 560, 569 (S.D. Ind. 1990); see also Con-
vergent Technologies, 122 F.R.D. at 558 (rejecting defense counsel's argument that state-
ments of two former employees obtained by plaintiffs counsel do not constitute work
product because they only contain facts or verbatim accounts of relevant events pro-
vided by the ex-employees).
277. See generally Waits, supra note 271.
278. See id. at 313. In Professor Waits's view, the unacceptably high costs "include the
mandatory duplication of investigative time and effort, the injury to justice when infor-
mation hidden in witness statements is not revealed from alternative sources, and the
astronomical expense of the battles which the doctrine itself guarantees." Id. at 307.
279. This proposal addresses and eliminates the concern set forth above, see supra
note 271, that an ex-employee would request her statement for the purpose of volunta-
rily disclosing it to opposing counsel.
280. Under this proposed rule, an attorney could discover the statement of a former
employee obtained by his adversary if the former employee refused the second interview
or agreed to the interview but refused to provide a second statement. If, however, the
attorney did not interview or depose the individual, or conducted an interview and did
not request a statement, then the original statements would remain shielded from dis-
covery under the work product doctrine.
281. A number of factors will affect how far in advance of the depositions the state-
ments should be produced. For example, if depositions of 10 former employees are
scheduled over several consecutive days, fairness would dictate that the deposing attor-
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Such a rule allowing discovery of witness statements, but only
under limited circumstances, serves the equally important but po-
tentially conflicting goals of (1) furthering the policy justification of
the work product doctrine by protecting from discovery the tangible
results of the attorney's labor and his thought processes2 2 and (2)
not allowing application of the doctrine to provide immunity for the
attorney who has improperly manipulated an individual's recollec-
tion of events.
Admittedly, the form and content of a former employee's state-
ment will inadvertently reveal certain theories and opinions of the
attorney who sought the statement. On the other hand, the ex-em-
ployee's statement is substantially different from other tangible
work product traditionally covered by the doctrine. The statement
is, or at least purports to be, the former employee's own recitation
of the relevant facts. If the statement is used to support a brief, the
attorney will represent to the court that these are the words of an
independent witness with personal knowledge of relevant events. If
the statement is used to refresh the ex-employee's recollection while
testifying, or to impeach his testimony, the attorney will represent
that the "original" statement of the facts, told in the witness's own
words, is the true one.
Regardless of when or how the statements are called into ser-
vice, counsel for both sides should have the opportunity, relatively
early in the litigation, to compare the statements obtained from the
same ex-employees. Comparison will inevitably reveal some dis-
crepancies. These differences may simply be a matter of semantics
that can be resolved by further contact with the ex-employee, or
they may be directly attributable to overreaching by one or both
counsel. In any event, counsel will know that the statements will be
subject to scrutiny by opposing counsel, and that any overreaching
on his part that results in conflicting statements from the same indi-
vidual will substantially undermine the credibility, and thus the util-
ney receive the statements at least a week in advance to prepare adequately. If, however,
only one ex-employee is being deposed, delivery of the statement 24 hours prior to the
deposition might be appropriate. If an attorney obtains the statements and cancels, and
does not reschedule the depositions, sanctions might include prohibiting the attorney
from using the statement for impeachment or any other purpose if the ex-employees
testify at trial.
282. The practical effect of not shielding the witness statements is fairly predictable.
As two legal scholars recently opined, "confidentiality is the handmaiden of effective
fact-development: if the law instead compelled lawyers to disclose the results of their
investigations, it would weaken the incentive to investigate." Bundy & Elhauge, supra
note 21, at 317 (footnote omitted).
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ity, of the statements, and also of live testimony from the former
employees. Counsel will thus be encouraged to exercise self re-
straint when "helping" the former employees prepare their respec-
tive statements.
3. Identity of Documents Discussed at Interviews.-Determining the
breadth of a former employee's knowledge of facts relevant to the
litigation often spurs inquiry during the informal interview into the
person's familiarity with certain documents. Of special interest to
the attorney are documents authored by, directly addressed or cir-
culated to, or otherwise seen by the employee during her period of
employment. Such documents can be as seemingly innocuous as a
time card indicating an employee's absence on a day when events
occurred that precipitated the litigation, or as momentous as an ac-
cident report in which a party (or a party's agent) acknowledges
culpability.
An attorney's preparation for this aspect of the interview may
prove a time-consuming and tedious task, as "witness-specific"
materials often must be culled from among the hundreds or
thousands of pages produced by the opposing party28 3 or from the
files of the attorney's own client.28 4 More importantly, the selection
process may reveal the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories" 285 of an attorney that Rule 26 deems deserving of
special safeguarding.28 6 Does the work product doctrine bar coun-
sel from discovering-either during a subsequent informal interview
or by written interrogatories or oral deposition-the specific iden-
tity of documents that her adversary discussed with a party's former
employee during an informal interview?
If Rule 26(b)(3) does not literally address the discoverability of
283. In one securities fraud class action, the court noted that "defendants produced
hundreds of thousands of documents, from which [plaintiffs] attorneys selected more
than 100,000 for copying." Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 313 (3d Cir. 1985).
284. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing that where opposing counsel was the deponent, the work product doctrine prohib-
ited discovery of specific documents she had compiled "from among voluminous files in
preparation for litigation").
285. Barrett Indus. Trucks v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
286. Professor Applegate believes that "[t]he collection of these documents impli-
cates the core work-product privilege for lawyers' mental impressions and thought
processes, even though each individual document is discoverable." Applegate, supra
note 9, at 315 (footnotes omitted); see also Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329 (compilation of
documents reflected attorney's "legal theories and thought processes, which are pro-
tected as work product"); Sporck, 759 F.2d at 316 (concluding that selection of docu-
ments comes within "the highly protected category of opinion work product").
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document selection,28 7 the rationale underlying the work product
doctrine certainly advocates its extension to this aspect of the trial
preparation process. As previously noted,2 8 8 the heightened protec-
tion accorded opinion work product that reveals the attorney's
mental impressions and theories of a case "reflects the view that
each side's informal evaluation of its case should be protected, that
each side should be encouraged to prepare independently, and that
one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed
preparatory work of the other side." '2 9 Certainly, the selection of
documents constitutes "detailed preparatory work" that results in
"tangible material"-that is, a binder or file containing copies of the
documents designated relevant by the attorney. Moreover, refusing
to require that the attorney reveal the specific documents she
deemed worthy of discussing with the former employee does not
shield the documents themselves from discovery. Most often, the
selected documents are culled from those that have been or most
likely will be produced by both parties pursuant to a document pro-
duction request. Thus, protecting the identity of the set of chosen
documents neither immunizes the discovery of each individual doc-
ument in the set, nor prevents the facts contained in the documents
from being revealed pursuant to depositions or other discovery de-
vices. 290 Rather, the invocation of the work product doctrine in this
instance merely forbids opposing counsel from preparing his case
"on wits borrowed from the adversary' 291 by obtaining an exhaus-
tive list of the documents that counsel deemed worthy of discussing
with the former employees.
In the context of documents used to prepare a witness for dep-
osition, courts have not hesitated to classify the selection of docu-
287. An argument could be advanced that the limitation of Rule 26(b)(3) to "docu-
ments and tangible things" precludes the Rule's direct application to an attorney's.selec-
tion of pre-existing documents. However, "the courts have rejected an interpretation of
Rule 26(b)(3) that provides protection only for an attorney's mental impressions that are
contained in 'documents and tangible things.'" Connolly Data Sys. v. Victor Technolo-
gies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 96 (S.D. Cal. 1987), and cases cited therein. In addition, the
selection and compilation of a subset of documents from among the hundreds or
thousands produced and placement of the chosen documents in a file or binder yields a
"tangible" result.
288. See supra Subpart IV.A.
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's notes for 1970 amendments.
290. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, 129 F.R.D. at 518 ("[T]he work product doctrine
does not protect discovery of the underlying facts of a particular dispute."); 8 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 273, § 2023, at 194 ("[T]he work product doctrine concept furnishes
no shield against discovery, by interrogatories or by deposition, of the facts that the
adverse party's lawyer has learned .... ").
291. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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ments as core work product. 292 In an antitrust and labor dispute,
for example, the plaintiff's counsel prepared a binder of documents
and used the binder to prepare current employees for deposition.
In rejecting the defense counsel's arguments that the binder did not
constitute work product, the court instructed:
The binder contains a small percentage of the extensive
documents reviewed by plaintiff's counsel. In selecting
and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel
could not help but reveal important aspects of his under-
standing of the case. Indeed, in a case such as this involv-
ing extensive document discovery, the process of selection
and distillation is often more critical than pure legal re-
search. There can be no doubt that at least in the first in-
stance the binders were entitled to protection as work
product.293
A further and more critical point of contention confronts courts
in deciding whether waiver of the work product protection occurs
when an attorney shows the selected documents to a witness, conse-
quently making the documents fair game for discovery when the wit-
ness is deposed.294 At the heart of this controversy is Federal Rule
of Evidence 612. Made applicable to discovery matters by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c), 29 5 Rule 612 provides in relevant part:
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the pur-
pose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion de-
termines it is necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at
the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness
thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which
292. The leading case in this area is Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74
F.R.D. 613, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also cases cited infra notes 293, 294.
293. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (citing
Berkey Photo Inc., 74 F.R.D. 613); see also Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that documents grouped by counsel for use in preparing defendant for deposi-
tion constitute work product "[blecause identification of the documents as a group will
reveal defense counsel's selection process, and thus his mental impressions" of the
case).
294. SeeJames Julian, 93 F.R.D. at 144-46; Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318; Omaha Pub. Power
Dist. v. Foster Wheel Corp., 109 F.R.D. 615, 616-17 (D. Neb. 1986).
295. Rule 30(c), governing discovery depositions, provides that "[e]xamination and
cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at trial under the provisions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id.
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relate to the testimony of the witness.29 6
Relying on Rule 612(2), one court concluded that the corporate
attorney waived work product protection when he showed the select
group of documents to employees in preparation for their deposi-
tions; accordingly, the court ordered production of the entire
binder of documents.29 7
For a number of reasons, however, Rule 612 should not be re-
lied upon to order production of deposition preparation materials
recognized as core work product. First, as one commentator has
noted, "Rule 612 is actually a poor candidate for a general waiver
rule. The language of the rule is silent on its relation to privilege,
and the rule's history lends no support to an expansive reading. 21 9
Irrespective of the wisdom of this particular interpretation of Rule
612, the rule does not, by its owns terms, apply to documents shown
by either counsel to a party's former employee during an informal
interview. Indeed, Rule 612 applies to a "witness." Assuming that
no deposition notice has been served prior to the interview, the ex-
employee has not yet attained that status.
Second, Rule 612 applies when the document is shown "to re-
fresh memory for the purpose of testifying. ' 29 9 The purpose of the
informal interview is to determine which individuals possess knowl-
296. FED. R. EvID. 612. The rule became effective July 1, 1975, and represented a
substantial departure from previous practice, which limited discovery of documents used
for refreshing recollection to those used while testifying. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7086. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the legislative history of the expansion of the rule to include docu-
ments used to refresh recollection before testifying, see James Julian, 93 F.R.D. at 144-
46.
297. See James Julian, 93 F.R.D. at 144-45; see also In re joint Eastern & Southern Dis-
trict Asbestos Litigation, 119 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. 1988). The New York court
acknowledged the work product nature of a book prepared by plaintiffs' counsel that
contained photographs of the defendants' products, logos, boxes, containers, and trade
dress as well as corporate histories of the defendants. See id. at 6. However, the court
ordered production of portions of the book that had been shown to persons designated
to testify at trial on the issue of product identification. See id. at 6-7. In so doing, the
court held that the defendants had established a substantial need for the materials, be-
cause "[d]efendants cannot by other means learn whether the book was used in a sug-
gestive fashion so as to encourage plaintifi I to recognize items he would not otherwise
recognize." Id. at 6.
298. Applegate, supra note 9, at 318. Professor Applegate explains that other courts
have refused to require wholesale disclosure of the documents shown to a witness in
preparation for deposition absent a showing by opposing counsel of "substantial need,"
as required to overcome the work product doctrine pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or a demonstration that each document meets Rule
612's foundational requirement of actually influencing the witness's recollection. Id. at
319-22.
299. FED. R. EvID. 612.
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edge that would make formal discovery worthwhile; querying the ex-
employee about select documents is an integral part of the screen-
300 ding process. Stated differently, counsel's intent in showing the
ex-employee select documents is not to refresh his memory per se,
but rather to determine whether he has any memory that may even-
tually need refreshing.
Third, when production is sought pursuant to Rule 612, the
court must determine that production "is necessary in the interests
ofjustice."' 30 1 In the informal interview stage, no grave injustice will
befall counsel in denying him access to the work product of oppos-
ing counsel; however, handing him on a silver platter the documents
selected by his adversary would hardly further the interests of jus-
tice that gave rise to the work product doctrine in the first instance
and continue to provide validity for its existence.
Further, if the former employee is subsequently elevated to wit-
ness status and deposed, deposing counsel is free to inquire as to
whether any specific documents that the witness reviewed with op-
posing counsel served to refresh the witness's memory on certain
subjects. If the answer is affirmative, then production of those par-
ticular documents may be warranted pursuant to Rule 612.02 Such
limited production, however, is a far cry from requiring counsel to
produce a comprehensive list of the documents discussed during
the informal interview. 03
[B]ecause identification of such documents would relate to
specific substantive areas raised by respondent's counsel,
respondent would receive only those documents which de-
posing counsel, through his own work product, was incisive
enough to recognize and question petitioner on. The fear
that counsel for petitioner's work product would be re-
vealed would thus become groundless.30 4
300. The author's view of the informal interview as an important screening mecha-
nism to determine what role, if any, a particular former employee will play in the litiga-
tion prevents her from agreeing with Professor Landsman's position that written
materials should never be shown to disinterested witnesses. See Landsman, supra note 3,
at 558-59.
301. FED. R. EvID. 612.
302. See, e.g., Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318 (holding that Rule 612 requires a threshold
showing that a witness relied on or was influenced by documents before inquiring into
content of those documents used to refresh witness's testimony).
303. See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318; see also Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheeler
Corp., 109 F.R.D. 605, 617 (D. Neb. 1986) (citing Sporck).
304. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318; see also Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Ha-
waii) Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (holding that discovery of documents
reviewed prior to deposition was not compelled by Rule 612 due to "insufficient estab-
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Of course, there are costs associated with denying opposing
counsel's request for wholesale discovery of the documents dis-
cussed during an informal interview between a party's ex-employee
and opposing counsel. Denial requires opposing counsel to
reinvent the wheel by independently reviewing the hundreds or per-
haps thousands of documents to postulate which of the documents
the other side deemed relevant to a particular former employee.
Requiring counsel to reconstruct the set of documents that his ad-
versary viewed as relevant may also substantially lengthen deposi-
tions, as counsel painstakingly inquires whether each of the
documents on his (probably over-inclusive) list were discussed with
the witness. Furthermore, compelling counsel to reveal the docu-
ment set may well identify the potential "smoking guns," thus al-
lowing litigants the opportunity realistically to assess their
respective allegations and defenses at an earlier stage of the litiga-
tion. Armed with more complete information, litigants could nego-
tiate equitable settlements before significant sums are spent
pursuing extensive formal discovery and preparing pretrial motions.
If increased efficiency were the sole objective of assessing and
revising the current discovery rules on this point, the preceding
points would provide sufficient reasons for allowing discovery of the
documents selected by counsel for review with a former em-
ployee. 0 5 But any efficiency gained must be weighed against the
interests sacrificed. In this instance, it is the work product doctrine
itself that is endangered, if not extinguished, by a rule that provides
counsel with a set of documents mapping his adversary's mental im-
pressions and theories of the case. Compelling an attorney to reveal
opinion work product further undermines a primary benefit of an
adversarial system of adjudication-encouraging adversaries "to
find and present their most persuasive evidence."5 0 6
In sum, the document review and selection process undertaken
lishment of actual use [to refresh memory] of any of the various documents" contained
in the file at issue).
305. If efficiency were the overriding concern, American legalists might be persuaded
to cast aside the existing pretrial discovery procedures in favor of a system involving
minimal pretrial preparation, as is found in Germany. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826-30 (1985). For a thoughtful
treatment of the argument that efficiency is not a proper cornerstone of a system of
adjudication, see Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litiga-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 748-57 (1987).
306. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 4
(1984). Furthermore, "[a]dherence to th[e] principle [of requiring independent prepa-
ration] affords the decision maker the advantage of seeing what each litigant believes to
be his most consequential proof. It also focuses the litigation upon the questions of
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by counsel in anticipation of conducting an informal interview of an
individual formerly employed by a party must constitute opinion
work product. As such, documents at issue because of that process
should be protected from discovery.
4. Content of Oral Communications.-Some courts have further
extended the work product doctrine to protect from discovery the
substance of oral communications between corporate counsel and a
nonparty, which are not otherwise protected by the attorney-client
privilege."0 7 The federal district court in Ford v. Philips Electronics
Instruments Co. 3 08 was at the forefront in attempting to draw the line
between permissible and impermissible avenues of inquiry as deter-
mined by application of the work product doctrine. During the dep-
osition of a nonparty witness, plaintiff's counsel objected to defense
counsel's inquiries about a predeposition conversation between the
witness and plaintiff's counsel. The court overruled the objection,
holding that:
Insofar as defendant's questions attempted to elicit from
the witness the specific questions that plaintiff's counsel
posed to him, or even the area of the case to which he di-
rected the majority of his questions, it exceeds the permis-
sible bounds of discovery and begins to infringe on
plaintiff's counsel's evaluation of the case. However, inso-
far as it was directed to the substance of the witness' knowl-
edge of relevant facts, it is clearly an acceptable line of
inquiry.309
Several courts have extended the Ford court's rationale to limit
the areas of inquiry in depositions of a party's former employee. In
one instance, the Ford court was cited as persuasive by a court disal-
lowing defense counsel's attempt to inquire into the specific ques-
tions that plaintiff's counsel had posed to a former employee, after
the plaintiff had retained the former employee as a consultant.
Questioning was also forbidden on the general area of the case to
which plaintiff's counsel had directed the former employee's atten-
greatest importance to the parties, making more likely a decision tailored to their
needs." Id.
307. See, e.g., IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1975); Connolly Data Sys. v.
Victor Technologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 96 (S.D. Cal. 1987); Phoenix Nat'l Corp. v.
Bowater United Kingdom Paper Ltd., 98 F.R.D. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Ford v. Philips
Elec. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. IBM, 79
F.R.D. 378, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
308. 82 F.R.D. 359 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
309. Id. at 360.
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tion. 3 1 0 While holding that no attorney-client relationship existed
between the former employee-consultant and corporate counsel, 3 ,I
the court opined that such "questions are improper as tending to
disclose the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal the-
ories of [plaintiff's] attorneys. "312
In a case where no "consulting" or other continuing relation-
ship existed, defense counsel telephoned a former employee of her
client several times in order to elicit the former employee's knowl-
edge of the facts involved in the litigation.31 3 Counsel decided to
take the former employee's deposition to preserve his testimony;
thereafter, she and the former employee had several other tele-
phone and face-to-face conversations "relating to his recollection of
relevant facts and the preparation of his deposition. ' 3 14 Question-
ing of the deponent by plaintiff's counsel regarding the substance of
the initial conversations and subsequent deposition preparation ses-
sions drew an objection from defense counsel. Although the court
rejected the plaintiff's claims that the conversations were protected
by the attorney-client umbrella,31 5 it cited the Ford analysis of the
work product doctrine as grounds for sustaining the plaintiff's ob-
jection.3 16 The "guidelines" provided by the court for additional
questioning of the defendant's former employee by plaintiff's coun-
sel allowed liberal inquiries into the deponent's knowledge of fac-
tual matters relevant to the litigation, but prohibited any probing of
the specific questions that defense counsel had asked of the former
employee, the general line of inquiry counsel had pursued, and "the
facts to which [defendant's] attorney appeared to attach significance
or any other matter that reveals [defendant's] attorney's mental
impressions, theories, conclusions or opinions concerning the
case."
317
These courts demonstrate the view that lengthening the work
product doctrine's shadow to eclipse even preliminary and informal
310. See Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
311. See id. at 518.
312. Id. at 519 (citing Ford, 82 F.R.D. at 360).
313. See Connolly Data Sys. v. Victor Technologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 90 (S.D. Cal.
1987).
314. Id. Corporate counsel also sent a set of documents to the former employee prior
to his deposition; any debate over the discoverability of the documents was short cir-
cuited by corporate counsel's voluntary relinquishment of the same materials to oppos-
ing counsel. See id.
315. See id. at 94.
316. See id. at 96.
317. Id. (citing Fordv. Philips Electronics Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
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conversations between counsel and former employees is logical and
desirable. Such an extension, however, should be seriously scruti-
nized. By its literal terms, the work product doctrine as set forth in
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to "docu-
ments and other tangible things," with special care given to material
that reflects an attorney's opinions on the case. Stretching the doc-
trine to cover the content of every oral communication between
counsel and a nonparty witness redefines the doctrine as an "attor-
ney opinion doctrine." That is, every time an attorney utters a
thought or opinion on a matter, it becomes privileged. In practice,
such a rule renders the attorney-client privilege useless; indeed,
many of the decisions that have extended work product protection
to conversations between counsel and a nonparty witness did so af-
ter holding that such conversations do not qualify under the attor-
ney-client privilege. s Perhaps more importantly, extension of the
doctrine to cover every comment made by counsel during an infor-
mal screening interview with a former employee prevents opposing
counsel from conducting meaningful inquiry into the seeds of bias
that counsel may have intentionally or inadvertently planted during
that interview.
Furthermore, determining permissible and inappropriate in-
quiries by applying the standards set forth in Ford and its progeny
presents self-evident difficulties. The Ford court's "split-the-baby"
approach interprets the work product doctrine as opening a window
for discovery of any facts communicated by counsel to the inter-
viewee, while at the same time slamming the door shut on even the
general subject area of the case to which counsel directed the inter-
viewee's attention. But inquiry as to the facts communicated inevi-
tably reveals the subject matter of the case that counsel discussed
with the former employee, as well as suggesting the possible ques-
tions posed by counsel; thus, a permissible line of exploration as to
what occurred during the interview must be carved with an almost
impossible degree of surgical precision. One predictable (and
highly undesirable) consequence of such a standard will be repeated
requests for judicial intervention to determine whether particular
questions transgress the evasive line of impermissible inquiries
drawn by Ford and like-minded courts.
For these reasons, the better-reasoned approach recognizes the
applicability of the work product doctrine to prohibit discovery of
318. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D.
I1. 1990); Connolly Data Sys., 114 F.R.D. at 89.
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tangible materials resulting from the attorney's work on the case,
including memoranda and notes drafted during or after interviews
with former employees, and collections of documents assembled
specifically for discussion with a particular former employee, but al-
lows disclosure of oral communications between counsel for either
party and a party's former employees. Thus, counsel should be per-
mitted to ask a former employee-either during an informal inter-
view or a deposition, held subsequent to the individual's ex parte
interview with opposing counsel-about the specific questions asked
by opposing counsel as well as the general subject matter discussed.
Stated differently, "[tihe opposing party will have full access to the
underlying information through substantive discovery, but the bur-
den remains on the questioner to select topics and documents to ask
about."' 19
Admittedly, this position may appear contrary to the argument
advanced in the preceding sections-that the advantages of main-
taining the adversarial system outweigh the efficiency gained by
compelling disclosure of witness statements and of sets of docu-
ments assembled by counsel for review with a former employee.
Similar arguments regarding the value of preserving the adversarial
nature of litigation undoubtedly would support a rule prohibiting
discovery of the content of all ex parte oral communications be-
tween counsel and a former employee. Indeed, denying discovery
of these communications would mandate additional efforts by coun-
sel to prepare her case without any hint whatsoever of her adver-
sary's perspective on a former employee's potential role in the
litigation.
But again, a benefit gained must always be balanced against the
cost. Denying counsel the opportunity to question a former em-
ployee on the content of oral communications between the ex-em-
ployee and opposing counsel would place the final brick in the wall
surrounding the ex parte interview. An attorney protected by this
unyielding barricade would be tempted to engage in blatant manip-
ulation of the ex-employee's recollection, and if he did succumb to
such temptation, opposing counsel would be powerless to penetrate
the work product barrier to reveal this source of intense bias. The
cost of such a rule is simply too great.
Although approaching a bright line test, the suggested applica-
tion of the work product doctrine to allow inquiry into oral commu-
nications between counsel and a former employee does not purport
319. Applegate, supra note 9, at 347.
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to provide perfect demarcation of acceptable interview or deposi-
tion questions regarding the content of prior informal interviews
conducted by opposing counsel. Inquiries regarding documents
discussed during the informal interview may continue to prove espe-
cially problematic. The attorney interviewing or deposing the for-
mer employee should be permitted to ask a former employee
whether a particular document that counsel had independently
identified as potentially relevant was discussed during the informal
interview with opposing counsel. If the document has been dis-
cussed, counsel should be permitted to inquire extensively into the
content of the communication between opposing counsel and the
former employee concerning the document. Counsel interviewing
or deposing a former employee may not, however, ask for wholesale
identification of every document reviewed with opposing counsel.
CONCLUSION
The determination of whether factual information in the pos-
session of certain individuals is discoverable usually necessitates the
balancing of various interests. In the case of former employees, per-
suasive arguments can be made for shielding the communications
with corporate counsel under the attorney-client privilege and for
piercing that shield, for prohibiting ex parte contacts with opposing
counsel and for promoting such contacts, and for providing limited
protection from discovery for certain attorney-generated materials
under the work product doctrine and for holding the doctrine inap-
plicable. Even if the arguments on each side of these issues attained
perfect equilibrium, however, the scales must tip in favor of disclo-
sure if the informal discovery process is to provide a meaningful
mechanism for uncovering all of the facts relevant to the litigation.
Accordingly, the following rules governing the informal discovery of
information held by former employees of a party are advocated:
1. Communications between corporate counsel and former
corporate employees that occur after termination of the employ-
ment relationship are not shielded from discovery by the attorney-
client privilege.
2. Discovery of information acquired by a party's former em-
ployees through ex parte, informal interviews is not precluded by
the ethical rules prohibiting contact of a represented party.
3. Notes, memoranda, and other tangible materials prepared
by counsel for either party during or following communications with
a party's former employees are immunized from discovery by appli-
cation of the work product doctrine. This rule prevents discovery of
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the identity of any compilation of documents shown by counsel to a
former employee, but does not bar discovery of the content of oral
communications between counsel and the former employee. Signed
witness statements are subject to discovery only where opposing
counsel has interviewed or has attempted to interview or depose the
former employee.
It seems inevitable that even before the ink dries on any pro-
posed black letter law, the need for exceptions to that law emerges.
The infinite number of variations in the responsibilities assigned,
the roles played, and the nature of the information held by former
employees, both during and after employment, virtually guarantees
that exceptions will be warranted if the general rules articulated
above are adopted. Those variations also preclude any attempt to
set forth a comprehensive listing of such exceptions at this time.
With that limitation in mind, the guidelines set forth above are not
offered as an end in themselves, but rather as one step in the devel-
opment of a comprehensive, practical, and fair body of law gov-
erning the informal discovery of information held by a party's
former employees.
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